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# Inter-Organizational Networks Among Intergovernmental Organizations In Peace Operations

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**INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS AMONG INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE OPERATIONS**

by

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## DEDICATION

*To my family*

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## CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

The CIA's Global Trend 2015 study (2005) anticipates that the United Nations (UN) and regional and sub-regional organizations will continue to be called upon to manage conflicts around the world because major states—stressed by domestic concerns, perceived risk of failure, lack of political will, or tight resources—will wish to minimize their direct involvement.

As conflicts and subsequent operations have become increasingly complex during the post-Cold War era, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a single organization to address them alone (GAO 2005 Report). Hence many of the tasks of modern peace operations require the collaboration and cooperation of many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) (Benner et al. 2011; Pearson et al. 2013)—international organizations that meet regularly, formed by treaty, and have three or more states as members (Pevehouse et al. 2003).[12]

For the vast majority of peace operations the UN has remained to be the executive agency (Morrison and Blair 1999). Even though in the formative years of the UN, regional organizations and arrangements were viewed as "detrimental to the universal approach embodied in the organization" (Alagappa 1999, 270; Claude 1964; Barnett 1995), now it is widely accepted that regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations should collectively contribute to the provision of international peace and security (Alagappa 1999; Boulden 2003; S/RES/1631 2005).

When Post-Cold War euphoria has waned with the rise of ethnic, sectarian and internal armed conflicts, the UN found itself operating in complex environments in which its "traditional adherence to the principle of non-use of force, except in self-defense, effectively

[1] This study only includes IGOs that have a bearing on issues of peace and war. More specifically, similar to Bjurner and Wallersteen's (2015) classification, the focus remains on
[2] The list of IGOs examined in this study is provided in Appendix.

left both blue helmets and local civilians at risk" (Benner et al. 2011, 14). These "new wars" (Kaldor 1999), required more nuanced ways of using force, and thus, new instruments, capacities, and capabilities, and a new "doctrine for military and police forces as well as new ways of information sharing and analysis" (Benner et al. 2011, 14). In order to share the burden of these complex missions, in a coordinated manner, the UN developed "a process of multilateral dialogue in the attempt to move from an ad hoc relationship to an organized and systematic collaboration under Chapter VIII of the Charter" (Felicio 2009, 16).[3]

A notable feature of the post-Cold War era with regard to peace operations, therefore, has been the vitalization of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and delegation of peace operations' tasks to regional organizations and arrangements (Bjurner and Wallensteen 2015). Regional and sub-regional organizations have been asked to step in and address security challenges and respond to perceived threats to international peace and security, involving mass atrocities, human tragedies and crimes against civilians committed by both state and non-state actors (Gelot 2012).

On the one hand, since regional and sub-regional organizations can be better positioned to provide early warning and monitor peace agreements, they became particularly crucial partners in addressing these new security challenges and threats (Felicio 2009). On the other hand, reluctance of the international community to commit resources (Boulden 2003) and intervene, as was the case in Rwanda, and detachment of the UN, particularly with regard to the African conflicts (Gelot 2012), compelled regional and sub-regional IGOs

[3] Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter lays out the foundation for regional organizations or arrangements to settle disputes before submitting to the UN Security Council. Yet, though these organizations may use enforcement action, such action cannot be "taken…without the authorization of the Security Council, without the exception of measures against any enemy state" (Chapter VIII, Article 53). Even though this article (Article 53) appears to establish a hierarchical relationship between regional (which is used as an umbrella term for sub-regional and extra-regional organizations) and the UN, this study treats them as equal entities.

to commit themselves to “the notion of home-grown solutions” (Babarinde 2011, 275), thus, to partner with other regional and sub-regional IGOs as well as to engage in peace operations alongside the UN (Sidhu 2006) forming networks of relationships.

This dissertation examines these partnerships and collaborative efforts among IGOs applying a network analysis perspective. The study focuses on then these inter-organizational networks—sets of organizations related through exchange relations or affiliations (Jones and Van de Ven 2013), whether formally structured through time or ad hoc in each conflict, including strategic alliances, collaboration and joint ventures (Brass et al. 2004)—the networking patterns among IGOs in peace operations and the effect of the structure of inter-organizational networks on success/failure of missions in implementing their core goals: violence abatement, conflict containment and settlement.

The increasing number and volume of partnerships and collaborations among IGOs in peace operations makes this topic particularly important. Notwithstanding the growing consensus on the benefits associated with collaborations among IGOs in peace operations (Boulden 2003; Francis 2006; Holt and Shanahan 2005; Artihano 2012), academic research thus far has neglected pressing questions of why IGOs form partnerships with one another, how they collaborate within a network context in peace missions and how these collaboration networks might account for the success/failure of peace operations.

This study addresses two specific questions. First, what are the factors that determine the formation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs, and the patterns of collaboration, i.e., the complimentary or parallel roles played by the collaborating IGOs in peace operations? Second, how do the structure and composition of these IGO networks in peace operations account for the success/failure of missions?

By confronting these questions, this study seeks to help us to gain a better understanding of peace operations, collaborations among IGOs engaged in these missions, and their effect on peace operations' outcomes. And thus, it addresses a significant lacuna in the theoretical and empirical research on peace operations' performance.

This introduction chapter proceeds as follows: First, I discuss the importance of the research question and this study's theoretical and empirical contributions to organizational studies and peace operations literature. Second, I provide an overview of the methods and datasets this study utilizes. Next, I introduce the taxonomy of peace operations used in this study. Then, I outline the contending theories and perspectives on the definition of the success and failure in peace operations. Last, I conclude by providing an outline of the chapters of this dissertation.

**Statement of the Research Problem**

Since the inception of UN peace-related operations in Palestine in 1948, peace operations have gone through substantive changes (Spieker 2000). While the end of bipolar world, and the improvement in West-East relations introduced new possibilities for addressing common security threats, social peace remained to be "challenged on the one hand by new assertions of discrimination and exclusion and, on the other, by acts of terrorism seeking to undermine evolution and change through democratic means" (An Agenda for Peace, para.11).

Due to a continually changing global environment, peace operations have evolved as well into an increasingly comprehensive and complex response by the "international community" (Morrison and Blair 1999; Brahimi Report 2000). Realizing that restoring enduring peace required more than "just ending overt fighting" (Durch and Berkman 2006, 11), in the late 1990s the UN took new responsibilities and tasks such as state and institution

building, peacebuilding missions, and wider range of peacekeeping, including policing, and robust peace enforcement (Kemp et al. 2013). These developments paved the way for further institutionalization within the UN, such as the establishment of the Office of the Rule of Law and Security Institutions and the Department of Field Support in the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (Kemp et al. 2013), and compelled the organization to seek out support from regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations, and thus, to become more effective in tapping outside sources of expertise and resources.

During that period, IGOs have begun to regularly meet, on the working level almost on a daily basis, and to coordinate a wide range of issues with regard to crises management. For instance, even though a stable cooperation among the UN, EU, and NATO was difficult during the Cold War due to ideological confrontations among member states, since the end of Cold War we have witnessed an increasing interaction among those organizations. Particularly in early 2000s, “the EU has managed to establish close inter-organizational links and coordination mechanisms with both NATO and the UN” (Koops 2008, 28).

The EU, in close cooperation with the UN, has conducted civil-military management operations, i.e., the EU police mission in Bosnia, military mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Koops 2008), and military bridging operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in Eastern Chad (EUFOR Tchad/RCA EEAS). Moreover, under the so-called the “Berlin Plus Agreement,” the EU and NATO have launched two integrated missions in Bosnia and Macedonia.

In peace operations stakes are very high. If done well, peace operations can stop or prevent recurrent violence, protect civilians from harm, and expedite the implementation of peace agreements. Failures, crimes and abuses hurt people, impair the legitimacy of peace operations, and curtail the likelihood of stable peace. As peace operations have become more complex “in terms of both the actors who conduct and authorize them and the tasks

they perform," (Bellamy and Williams 2010, 3), it has become particularly critical to study, analyze, and understand concepts, theories, histories, work of international bureaucracies in the field, and future challenges of peace operations (Bellamy and Williams 2010).

Even though collaborations among IGOs in peace operations have become common and viewed as crucial, even indispensable, the conditions and outcomes of inter-organizational collaborations, networking, have remained understudied. Although prior studies (Biermann 2008; Balas 2011a; Balas 2011b) dealt with the questions as what factors determine cooperation between IGOs in the context of peace operations, they did not explain the possible relationship between patterns and structure of inter-organizational collaborations—analyzed in a network context—in peace operations and effectiveness of these missions, nor did they distinguish between the effects of various structures on interrelationships.

Networks are highly complex as compared to other forms of inter-organizational interactions, e.g., hierarchies and markets, and are composed of various configurations—patterns, which emerge time and again in network formation processes: dyads, triads, organization-sets, and action-sets (Biermann 2008). Different from prior studies on inter-organizational networks in peace operations (Yost 2007; Biermann 2008), which only focused on the dyadic level (micro level) interactions between organizations (Balas 2011a; Balas 2011b), this study seeks to explain the micro level as well as the macro-level interactions among IGOs: organizational aggregates and their autonomous effects. In other words, I examine not only dyads of IGOs, but also triads, and entire networks of IGOs in peace operations and the conditions that make for varied forms of networking and the effect of these configurations and the network structure on success/failure of peace operations.

This study seeks to bring inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs in conducting peace operations to the forefront and evaluate their role and the extent of their contribution to the peace operations' performance in undertaking their core goals. This study moves beyond discussions on success/failure of peace operations that revolve around a number case studies to a deeper, and more systematic understanding of the theoretical issues involved in forming and maintaining collaborative alliances, and the outcomes of these collaborative efforts in the conduct of peace missions. More specifically, this study offers a comprehensive analysis of preconditions and processes of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs in peace operations and how these collaborative efforts account for the success and failure of such missions.

**Theoretical and Empirical Contributions**

This dissertation offers several empirical and theoretical contributions. Adopting a network perspective, this dissertation is the first study that longitudinally investigates the formation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs engaged in peace missions. In that sense, this study enlarges the literature on intergovernmental organizations and their collaborations.

As noted earlier in the chapter, though collaborative relations have been increasing across the IGOs conducting peace operations, we still do not know what are the factors that enhance the formation of these collaborative efforts in peace operations. This dissertation applies a multi-theoretical multi-level (MTML) framework (Noshir et al. 2006) to analyze the factors that initiate these collaborative relations. Since there is no dominant theory that fully explains why and how organizations collaborate, MTML framework is useful to explain IGO collaborations across multiple theories and levels to gain a "more complete picture of the design and operation" (Sowa 2009, 1005) of these collaborative efforts.

This study also engages in a comparison of the rhetoric used by IGOs with regard to their collaborative efforts and the actual experience on the ground (Boulden 2013). While many scholars (Balas 2011a; Bellamy and Williams 2013) point out the importance of collaborative efforts among IGOs, there is no research that explores and assesses these collaborations' effect in peace operations' outcomes. Thus peace operations literature is in need of scholarship that offers both theoretical and empirical insights on how collaborations among IGOs affect the performance peace missions. This study seeks to fill this gap in the literature on peace operations by analyzing the link between peace operations effectiveness and inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs.

By using network specific measures, such as centralization and density, this dissertation assesses the role of IGO networks in peace operations outcomes, and provides a framework to interpret how IGO networks' structure and composition affect how peace missions perform in implementing their core goals.

This study furthermore contributes to the literature on peace operations by providing a systematic analysis of the success and failure of peace operations based on the *Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria*[4] across a large number of peace operations. While this framework is widely used among scholars to judge the performance of peace operations (Whalan 2012; Braithwaite 2012; Druckman and Diehl 2010; Bellamy and Williams 2013), the existing literature prominently focuses on single country/conflict case studies. However, as Boulden (2013) points out, this approach leads to concerns over generalizability with regard to the extent which these case studies can afford a solid enough foundation for useful comparisons. By analyzing collective successes of all peace missions deployed in internal armed conflicts between 1990-2013 and employing the *Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria,*

[4] A detailed explanation of the *Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria* is provided in Chapter 5.

this study sets a foundation for predicting how the structure and composition of inter-organizational networks play out in relation to the success and failure of peace operations in accomplishing their core goals.

This study also incorporates three illustrative cases in addition to statistical analyses. In that sense, this dissertation makes a stand alone contribution to the case study literature (Boulden 2013) associated with peace operations as these are the first case studies (regarding the countries under study) that illustrate the possible link between the success of peace missions and collaborative efforts among the IGOs operating in these conflicts.

As a whole this project seeks to fill a gap in the existing literature on peace operations by exploring IGO collaborations' impact on the conduct and performance of peace mission. Analyzing and comparing the role of inter-organizational interactions in conducting peace operations will broaden studies on organizational learning and practices by providing insights on which types of IGO networks and collaborations perform better than others, and why. Consequently, this may allow for the design and conduct of more effective missions and provide an impetus for repeating these best practices in future operations.

**Methods and Dataset**

Analyses of this study rely on two new datasets: 1) Collaborations among IGOs, 2) IGO Networks in Peace Operations.

The dataset on the formation and evolution of IGO collaborations is drawn from the Dyadic Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations Dataset compiled by Balas (2011b), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Multilateral Peace Operations Database, IGO reports and briefings.[5]

[5] A more detailed explanation of this dataset is provided in Chapter 3.

To investigate the factors that drive the formation and evolution of peace operations, I employ social network analysis, more specifically the Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models (TERGM).[6] Drawing on *Collaborations among IGOs* dataset, I construct matrices—for each year under study—that illustrate the absence and presence of collaborations between IGO dyads included in the dataset. Additionally, a matrix of IGO characteristics, such as the region in which IGOs are headquartered, their organizational function, resource level capacity and type, is built and included in the model.

The second dataset, *IGO Networks in Peace Operations*, constitutes characteristics of IGO networks, e.g., centralization and density, engaged in peace missions in internal armed conflicts during the time period under study as well as the conflict and host country characteristics. This dataset relies on a variety of data sources that are discussed in detail in Chapter 5. Drawing on this data, I use logistic regression with cubic splines to account for the temporal dependence in my models. Further discussion regarding this specific method is provided in Chapter 5 as well.

In addition to quantitative analyses, I use illustrative cases to assess my findings with regard to the relationship between IGO networks' composition and structure, and peace operations' performance in implementing their core goals, i.e., violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement. The first case examines the role of collaborations among AU, ECOWAS, and the UN in operations' success in dampening the violence in Cote d'Ivoire. The second case explores how collaborative efforts by the NATO, UN, OSCE and EU have helped to contain the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) after the Dayton Peace Agreement. The last case, Sudan:Darfur, highlights the effect of collaborations among IGAD, AU, UN, and the Arab League on conflict settlement success.

[6] A detailed overview of this model is provided in Chapter 3.

## Some Conceptual Issues

### What are Peace Operations?

Peacekeeping has never been defined in the United Nations Charter. Indeed, the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld "improvised the practice in response to the Suez Crisis with the creation of the First United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I), and later Secretaries-General the UN have followed in his footsteps by adapting peacekeeping on the fly to meet new international challenges" (Levine 2014, 6).

Notwithstanding their absence in the UN Charter, the UN peacekeeping operations derive their legal standing from Chapters VI and VII of the Charter. While Chapter VI, "The Pacific Settlement of Disputes," grants the UN Security Council and the General Assembly the authority to take the necessary steps to settle the disputes, Chapter VII gives the Security Council the authority to take measures necessary to restore "international peace and security" (*Charter of the United Nations*).

However the notion of peace operations goes beyond merely peacekeeping, and is a broader concept. Peacekeeping was originally to be the use of neutral forces to separate warring parties and prevent the recurrent of fighting, what came to be termed "preventive diplomacy."

This dissertation uses the Bellamy and Williams's taxonomy to define peace operations. Bellamy and Williams (2005) define peace operations as the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel, such as police, troops, military experts and observers. Peace operations based on this criterion should have an explicit mandate to "assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or enforce

ceasefires, peace agreements or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace" (Bellamy and Williams 2005, 14).

More specifically, peace operations refer to peace missions, e.g., preventive deployments, traditional peacekeeping, wider peacekeeping, peace enforcement, assisting transitions, transitional administrations, and peace support operations (Bellamy et al. 2010), carried out by troops in operations by IGOs (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Based on this taxonomy, in preventive deployments, peacekeepers are deployed in order to prevent a probable conflict. For instance, the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP)—the first mission in the history of UN peacekeeping to have a preventive mandate—was established in Macedonia in 1995 to prevent the disputes before they morph into serious conflicts.

Traditional peacekeeping operations intend to facilitate the negotiation of a political settlement; in these types of operations, traditional peacekeepers work with the belligerents and do not enforce any particular solution. Wider peacekeeping operations facilitate the deployment of traditional peacekeeping missions and assist transitions. These operations fulfill the aims of traditional peacekeeping along with other tasks, such as providing humanitarian relief. Peace enforcement, sometimes characterized as "robust peacekeeping" (Nsia-Pepra 2011; 2014) deployments command the will of the United Nations Security Council to the conflicting parties. In some conflict situations, such as the presence of spoilers, or militias that threaten peacekeepers or civilian population, the Security Council has granted UN peacekeeping operations "robust mandates" (DPKO Capstone Doctrine 2008). Thus robust and traditional peacekeeping might require different types of inter-organizational collaboration; as for example peace enforcement might entail the need for more supplies and troop reinforcements.

Robust mandates authorize peacekeeping operations to "use all necessary means" to defend the mission and provide the security of peacekeepers (Coning et al. 2008). Even though the line between peace enforcement and "robust" peacekeeping might blur at times, important differences exist between these two missions. For instance, "while robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article (2) of the Charter unless authorized by the Security Council" (DPKO Capstone Doctrine 2008, 19).

By deploying police, military and civilian personnel, assisting transitions facilitate the implementation of political transition in the host country. Transitional administrations are deployed after the implementation of peace agreement, and can have the control of a particular territory or country, e.g., its economy, borders, the media. Furthermore, these administrations might run hospitals, schools as well as administer the judicial system. Lastly, peace support operations "aim to establish liberal democratic political systems and societies within the state" (Bellamy et al. 2010, 9).

**What is Success? Perspectives on Success and Failure**

As Maley (2013) notes evaluating the success of peace operations is not a straightforward undertaking and "any endeavors in this area are complicated by a range of intellectual challenges that flow from the complexity of the subject matter" (Maley 2013, 1). One area of complexity can be attributed to the very meaning of word "success." What do we mean by "success"?

Over the years a considerable amount of research (Druckman and Stern 1997; Stedman et al. 2002; Diehl 2008; MacQueen 2008; Lijn 2009; Bellamy et al. 2010) has

documented the outcomes of peace operations—success and failure. Even though a variety of scholarly "cultures" has dealt with this debate, there is no consensus on how to define success, and the elements, factors, and practices that would lead to success or failure of a mission (MacQueen 2008).

The literature on success and failure of peace operations is dominated by three perspectives (MacQueen 2008). The scholars in the first school of thought, e.g., William Durch and Paul Diehl, mainly concentrate on the means and ends of the missions. That is to say, first, they focus on whether a mission was able to stop the violence and contribute to the process of peace making. Second, they note that the mandate of a mission, and willingness on the part of the UN members have critical importance in affecting performance of peace operations (MacQueen 2008).

Bellamy and Williams (2005) concede that using the same criteria to judge the success and failure of different types of operations would be disingenuous since each operation aims to accomplish different objectives. Yet by evaluating a mission based on how well it accomplishes its mandate, this problem can be overcome (Bellamy and Williams 2005). However, some scholars (Diehl 1994; Findlay 2002; Diehl 2008) also note that although a mission's mandate is seen as an important factor in accounting for success and failure of the peace operation, using mandate alone to assess a mission's success/failure is problematic. Because "mandates are a product of political deliberation and compromise" (Diehl 2008, 123), often they are vague, and inconsistent (Boucher 2010); hence it is difficult to determine whether objectives of the mandate have been attained. Furthermore, mandates might be inflexible in that they cannot address the changing conditions on the ground (Ozerdem 2006; Diehl 2008); therefore "what peacekeepers are attempting to do may no

longer reflect the standards present in the mandate" (Diehl 2008, 123) and might thereby lead to the judgment that operation failed.

Effective peace operations, Durch and Berkman (2006) suggest, do not have to be "solving everyone's problems for all time but they do require that underlying grievances be resolved or successfully shifted into non-violent channels for resolution. When these tasks are accomplished, complex operations can end gracefully, even when many other local problems remain" (Durch and Berkman 2006, 100).

The second school of thought assesses the outcomes of missions from a broader perspective. Although they do not rule out the importance of achieving the mission's mandate as an element of success, analysts and scholars in this school of thought argue that the most important contribution that a peace operation can make is to achieve a permanent peace in the broadest sense. Therefore, they assert that in order for a mission to be viewed as successful, it must contribute to an economic equality and harmonious relations within or between societies (MacQueen 2008).

The last perspective judges the effect of a mission from regional and global perspective. Success, the scholars in that third school of thought suggest, "can be judged by the extent to which the peacekeeping instrument lubricated the machinery of the state-based international system" (MacQueen 2008, 3). Similarly, for Lijn (2009) in order to qualify as a success, the peace operation should contribute to the establishment of ten years of negative peace and "a positive development in remedying the causes of the conflict" (Lijn 2009, 46).

As noted above, scholars disagree on how to evaluate the impact of peace operations. To illustrate, according to Diehl and Druckman (2010) and Ratner (1995), scholars should employ quantitative analysis to measure the implications of operations. Lastly, though peace operations have different mandates, they do share common goals.

While these peace operation goals are mostly associated with traditional peacekeeping operations, "virtually all peace operations seek to achieve violent abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement" (Diehl and Druckman 2013, 16). Therefore, rather than examining peace operations outcomes based on only one success criterion, employing the *Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria,* I assess the success of peace operations with regard to the core goals they try to implement, i.e., conflict abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement. Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion of the *Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria* this study employs.

**Conclusion**

This dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) develops a theoretical perspective to discuss the factors that drive the formation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs in undertaking peace operations' tasks. The second part (Chapters 4 and 5) explores the impact of these collaborative efforts, which are examined in a network context, on the performance of peace operations, more specifically the success and failure of peace operations in abating violence, containing and settling conflicts in internal armed conflicts.

Even though the role of nation states and unilateral interventions are touched upon, the focus of this study remains IGOs, inter-organizational interactions, and the joint impact of these collaborative efforts on the success or failure of peace missions. Furthermore, this dissertation is not a study on the sources of conflict or civil wars. Though the background of conflicts are briefly discussed particularly in illustrative cases part, the discussion focuses on the period leading up to the deployments by IGOs and thereafter.

**Outline of the Dissertation**

Chapter 1 outlines the trends in peace operations, and inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs in such missions, followed by the introduction of the research statement. It provides definitions of peace operations based on the *Bellamy-Williams taxonomy* and introduces the perspectives on peace operations' success.

Chapter 2 discusses the theory on inter-organizational collaboration. It addresses the questions such as: What are the factors that may determine the formation and evolution of collaborative relations and partnerships between IGOs in conducting peace operations?

Chapter 3 introduces research design, and discusses a class of network statistical models, Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGMs), and their extension to Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models (TERGMs). In this chapter, I present my results regarding the factors that determine IGOs to collaborate in peace operations.

Chapter 4 briefly surveys the academic literature on the success and failure of peace operations, and elaborates a theoretical framework to examine the impact of IGO networks' structure and composition on outcomes of peace operations, more specifically, the success and failure of peace operations in implementing their core goals—violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement—based on the *Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria*.

Before analyzing the illustrative cases, Chapter 5 introduces research design and provides a discussion on the variables and findings regarding the relationship between IGO networks and peace operations' performance in implementing their core goals.

Chapter 6 first summarizes the findings in relation to the key questions of this study: 1) Why do IGOs collaborate in peace operations? 2) How do IGO networks account for the performance of peace operations? Then, it discusses theoretical, empirical and policy implications of my findings. Finally, it presents a research agenda for future studies.

# CHAPTER 2 THEORY AND EMPIRICS IN THE STUDY OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION

## Introduction

Inter-organizational collaboration among intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in peace operations presents an interesting puzzle—IGOs often find themselves "pulled between two competing views of collaboration" (Thomson and Perry 2006, 20). One the one hand, extreme conditions, such as violence against civilians, humanitarian catastrophes, failed states, institutions, and economies, are difficult, even impossible for a single organization to deal with. On the other hand, "despite the popularity and benefits of inter-organizational relationships, not all of the evidence is positive. Many inter-organizational relationships fall short of meeting the expectations of their participants or fail for other reasons" (Barringer and Harrison 2000, 368).

The main motive to participate in an inter-organizational network "primarily comes from an organization that has the opportunity to accomplish a goal that it otherwise would not be able to achieve on its own" (Lee et al. 2012, 551). Akin to interfirm collaborative linkages, cooperation among IGOs in peace operations can provide the benefit of resource sharing, which allows organizations to combine their experience, skills, physical, human and financial assets and knowledge, and thus, facilitate bringing together complementarity assets of participating IGOs (Richardson 1972).

Nevertheless, there are also costs associated with collaboration, such as loss of organizational identity, autonomy and image, as they have to pay attention to and accommodate collaborating IGOs' demands (Thomson and Perry 2006; Balas 2011; Brosig and Motsamai 2014). Additionally, even though resource dependency and complementarities are among the major determinants for organizations to cooperate, collaboration can add financial burdens and complicate distribution of resources and tasks. Skepticism about

forging inter-organizational relations also derives from operational, administrative and political concerns that may lead to frictions and mistrust among partners. African Union (AU) cooperation with the United Nations (UN), for instance, have been problematic in the past owing to “debates over the role of the International Criminal Court in cases including Darfur and Libya” (Gowan and Sherman 2012, 2) and frictions reportedly have arisen at times over issues such as unequal compensation for those in the armed forces contingents (Boutellis and Williams 2013).

Further, the increased deployment of peace operations since the end of the Cold War led many scholars and practitioners to question whether regional arrangements and organizations might outweigh the UN’s role in peace missions and compete with the organization regarding mission personnel (Daniel 2008). Similarly, as mentioned earlier, the desire for autonomy inhibits the inter-organizational collaborative efforts. Harsch (2015), for instance, notes that the depth of UN-European Union (EU) cooperation was curbed during the early 2000s since European states sought “to avoid subordinating their personnel to UN command and control mechanisms” (Harsch 2015, 168). Furthermore, deployment of parallel operations in a single theater is regarded as highly inefficient since different chains of command and rules of engagement for each organization can hamper the collaborative efforts (Gowman and Sherman 2012).

In addition to problems associated inter-organizational cooperation in general, certain types of cooperation might be more likely to remain particularly sensitive (Gowan and Sherman, 2012) and further inhibit the initiation of collaborations. Rapid reaction forces, for example, have always been a point of controversy between IGOs in peace missions. Even though in theory well-equipped IGOs such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the EU would be able to deploy rapid reaction forces to assist less well-resourced regional

organizations, as was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003, there is no guarantee that these reinforcements would always be available as given states' political and military calculations to contribute to peacekeeping forces would be subject to change and uncertainty on case-by-case basis (Gowan and Sherman 2012).

Why then do IGOs cooperate despite the costs associated with inter-organizational collaboration? They collaborate since it is, for the most part, in their interest to do so, such as organization survival, having access to resources.[7] Hence even though IGOs may compete for resources, influence, organizational autonomy and identity, they may benefit from "increased collaboration to enhance harmonization" (Fischer et al. 2012, 441) and coordination as multicultural, multinational, and complex peace operations occur in difficult security, humanitarian and economic environments that require effective collaborative efforts and coordination. Additionally, when the profit motive is removed from the calculation, as is the case in inter-organizational collaborations in peace operations, cooperation becomes more appealing as "the potential downsides of cooperation, such as reduced autonomy, shared resources, and increased dependence, are less likely to be seen as a threat to survival" (Provan and Milward 2001, 415).

Furthermore, the lack of logistical assets, and capabilities "which involve more than just the technical training and equipping of individuals and light infantry forces for peacekeeping" (The Challenges Project 2005, 18) compels organizations to turn to other IGOs that can offer these capacities. IGOs such as the EU, UN and NATO, as they are able to provide the required resources, therefore are often called upon to sustain a given mission. For instance, the UN has taken over the missions in Liberia in 2003, and Ivory Coast in

[7] Although IGOs do not have complete autonomy in their decision to collaborate as they are tasked to partner by decisions of their voting member states, they may develop the interests in collaboration once they are directed to collaborate.

2004, since regional powers and IGOs, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), lacked the necessary resources to carry on these operations (Daniel 2008). However, the reverse may hold as well. Extra-regional organizations, such as NATO, the EU or the UN may hand off missions to regional counterparts, as was the case in Burundi where the UN handed over the mission to an AU special task force (Bah and Jones 2008), as regional organizations have greater cultural familiarity in the countries in which they are deployed and presumably enhance the legitimacy of the mission.

In addition, today's multifunctional missions require complementary assets provided by different organizations to carry on effective missions. To illustrate, the UN Interim Administration Missions in Kosovo (UNMIK) was divided into different pillars each of which was carried out by different IGOs. The UN, for instance, carried out Pillars One and Two of UNMIK, the civilian administration and humanitarian assistance, respectively. Pillar Three consisted of democratization and institution building was led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Finally, the EU led Pillar Four, which was in charge of economic reconstruction (Hansen et al. 2004).

In this chapter, I discuss the factors that might account for the formation of ties among IGOs in peace operations. Such ties, either in isolated cases or in on-going or repeated collaborations, constitute forms of social networks, or as such are amenable to methods of social network analysis. Drawing from communication, public administration, public management, organizational studies, and international relations, I apply a multi-theoretical and multilevel (*MTML*) model to explain the emergence, evolution (e.g., manifested in the evolution of the IGO networks from that are sparse to those dense) and dissolution of inter-organizational collaborative networks among IGOs in peace operations, as well as the structure of these networks. I focus on theories of homophily, resource

dependency, collective action, social capital and alliance/coalition formation. However, before I detail a theoretical framework identifying the potential factors affecting the formation of these networks, I address how this study frames cooperation, collaboration and coordination.

While this and next chapter remain focused on the motives that would account for the emergence of IGO networks engaged in peace operations, Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the role of these networks in affecting the success and failure of peace missions.

**Typology of Inter-Organizational Collaboration**

The literature on inter-organizational collaboration (Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Thomson 2001) defines collaboration as an iterative and cyclical process that is executed in a reciprocal fashion. For Thomson (2011), collaboration represents a process that creates rules and norms through formal and informal negotiation and interaction. Collaboration, therefore, exhibits "a higher-order level of collective action than cooperation and coordination" (Thomson and Perry 2006, 23). Drawing on studies on inter-organizational collaboration, Thomson and Perry (2006) point out that cooperation and collaboration represent processes regarding the depth of integration, commitment and interaction, with "cooperation falling at the low end of the continuum and collaboration at the high end" (Thomson and Perry 2006, 23). Likewise for Gray (1989), collaboration is the end result of cooperation and coordination. In other words, collaboration manifests a longer process in which actors can explore their differences and consequently the ways to find common ground for addressing their problems (as cited in Thomson and Perry 2006). Thus collaboration in a sense implies a condition of greater comfort and familiarity among the participants than the more distant notions of cooperation or coordination.

Nevertheless this study subsumes explanations and analyses of both cooperative and collaborative efforts among IGOs, as a peace mission in a given conflict might take place over years; still, within such missions, two or more IGOs might work together only for part of the time or for short periods. Therefore, both types of missions will be examined, i.e., those taking place for a short period of time—considered as a cooperative or coordinated relationship—and longer collaborations that might lead to the formation of norms, values, and common practices among organizations that launch the operations.

In peace operations, cooperation is the process of exploring possibilities in partnership with other intervening parties, i.e., IGOs, and pursuing a course of action to address the mission challenges. Collaborations tend to institutionalize and build upon those explorations. The principal thematic areas of cooperation and collaboration in such operations include: "operational concept development, detailed operational programming, conduct of operations, including specific operations related to: security; governance; institution building; rule of law (ROL); disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); security sector reform (SSR); human rights; gender; refugee return and humanitarian assistance; information sharing; operational priority setting; resolution of inter-cultural conflicts; education and training; and the evaluation of progress" (The Challenges Project 2005, 14).

**Inter-Organizational Networks and Theory**

The expansive literature, drawn from business management, sociology, public administration and international relations, on inter-organizational networks addresses the questions such as where inter-organizational collaborations come from, and how they emerge (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999), that is, identifying and explaining the factors that might drive the formation of collaborative networks (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). In organizational

studies, networking is regarded as “a strategic inter-organizational response to a globalized and increasingly dynamic, and complex business environment inhabited by more sophisticated consumers” (Henry et al. 2004, 842). Organizations, therefore, come together in a collaborative framework in networks in order to address dynamic and multidimensional problems, e.g., violent conflicts, disaster relief, and counter-terrorism.

Researchers adopting a network perspective to examine the motivation to collaborate rely on various theories to fully explain why organizations engage in collaborations and what they seek to obtain from these collaborations (Sowa 2009) as no single theory can fully explain this phenomenon. Thus scholars have developed useful frameworks for studying collaborations across multiple theories to acquire a more complete picture of the design and operation of collaborations (Sowa 2009). In conjunction with multiple theory framework, I apply the MTML model, with some modifications, to determine what factors foster the initiation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations in the conduct of peace operations.

**Social Network Theory and the Multi-Theoretical Multi-Level Model**

Social network analysis detects and interprets patterns of social ties, e.g., formation of dyadic and triadic ties (Nooy et al. 2011, 5). Being different from markets and hierarchies, networks are seen as “agile” (Contractors et al. 2006, 681), and dynamic entities (Westby 2012) that change as ties form, or disappear from the network (Everton 2012).

The network perspective can be applied to a variety of frameworks as well as actors. Actors—“nodes"—may be any social unit such as firms, collective entities, individuals, organizations, and divisions within organizations (Contractor et al. 2006). Relations among actors in social networks can be any kind of linkage, including affective expressions, such as friendships, workflows, social interactions, transfers of material or nonmaterial resources

(goods, expertise), formal role relations, and business alliances (Monge and Contractor 2003).

Network analysis is an analytic technique which allows researchers to represent relational data, examine and explore the properties and the overall nature of these relations, and the interdependencies through these relations (Monge and Contractor 2003). As noted earlier, in networks relations are represented by ties or links, which are assigned properties in the network. Strength of ties, which shows the quantity or intensity of the relationships, can be either binary—the presence or absence of a relationship—or valued which indicates frequency and intensity of the link. Also relations in a network can be directed or undirected. Directed relations include the ones that the relation has an origin and a destination, as in communication networks (Lusher and Robins 2013). Nondirectional (undirectional) ties are those that do not have a direction. For instance, a relation that is “strategically allied with” is nondirectional since in this type of relationship, two individuals, firms, states, or organizations are tied without a direction or in a two-way relationship (Monge and Contractor 2003).

Networks are represented in two forms: matrices and graphs. Network data can be organized in square data matrices, which are also known as sociomatrices, in order to represent the data on interconnections of participants (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). Additionally, network data may be depicted via graphs in which lines and vectors connect the nodes.

Contractor et al. (2006) suggest that even though representing networks as graphs or matrices and measuring the properties of the network (e.g., centralization) are essential to diagnose network structure and patterns of network formation they only afford descriptive explanations. Therefore, the emergence of networks, for Monge and Contractor (2003), should be explained using an analytic framework, which “enables inferences to be made on

the basis of theories and statistical tests" (Monge and Contractor 2003, 45). Thus they introduce the MTML model, which is "an integrated theoretical and analytic framework that provides an appropriate basis for studying multiple substantive theories across several analytic levels on the basis of valid statistical inference techniques" (Monge and Contractor 2003, 45). Put differently, the MTML framework is intended to relate various social theories with specific network properties and to develop theory-driven hypotheses in order to explain network formation, evolution, and dissolution (Monge and Contractor 2003).

The MTML perspective integrates and compares diverse theories and enhances the explanations of network evolution (Monge and Contractor 2001; Monge and Contractor 2003) by distinguishing exogenous and endogenous variables that account for the probability of the absence or presence of ties between network actors (Monge and Contractor 2003; Contractor et al. 2006). Endogenous variables derive from structural tendencies hinged upon interdependencies within the networks (Atouba and Shumate 2010), whereas exogenous variables include actor attributes, such as similar or different organizational bureaucracies or capacities, as well as "properties of other relations among the network of nodes, and the same network of relations at previous points in time" (Monge and Contractor 2003, 61). In other words, exogenous variables are independent of, and external to, the network (Monge and Contractor 2003), though in a feedback loop network developments and ties may come to influence some of the exogenous factors over time, such as bureaucratic procedures or perceptions within the participating organizations or their sub-units. Lusher and Robins (2013) note that including both exogenous and endogenous explanations are important in making the right inferences about actor attributes and structural tendencies, such as formation of mutual ties at the dyadic level, and network centralization at the aggregate or

global level. By doing so, we do not underestimate (or overestimate) the importance of either organizational attributes or network structure.

As stated above, both endogenous and exogenous variables might account for network configurations. Variables that are endogenous to the network "capture the extent to which relational properties of the network influence its self-organization" (Contractor et al. 2006, 686) and indicate whether "the configuration of ties in the observed realization reflects an underlying structural tendency that is consistent with the hypothesized network property" (Contractor et al. 2006, 686). A "network theory" presumes that the structure of the inter-organizational collaboration network is an intrinsic element. That is to say, the structure of the network affects the actions of the network actors and the actions of actors affect the structure of the network (Cranmer et al. 2012a).

**Endogenous Explanatory Factors**

Prior studies on IGO collaborations (Balas 2011a, 2011b) do not address the complex dependencies in the formation of IGO partnerships. Collaborations among IGOs constitute a network process as the presence or absence of collaboration between any two IGOs in peace missions can account for the collaboration between other pairs of IGOs, hence "rendering the edges of the network dependent on one another" (Cranmer et al. 2014, 6).

Endogenous structures that are instrumental to the network generating process in peace operations represent "a full departure from what is possible with standard regression models" or other approaches to theory building and testing (Cranmer et al. 2012b, 299). Entailed here are such factors as dyadic and triadic dynamics and the notion of transitivity.

*Triadic Closure*

A triad is composed of any set of three network actors (e.g., IGOs in peace operations networks). Similar to the process laid out by Heider's (1958) cognitive balance

theory that suggests that “when two people like each other and agree about a topic, such as their feelings about a third, then cognitive balance occurs” (Felmlee and Faris 2013, 448), the classic process of triadic closure (Rapoport 1957) in peace operations occurs when two IGOs which do not collaborate with one another, but each have a collaborative link with a third IGO, decide to cooperate. This process then creates a triangle (a set of three IGOs which are all tied; see Goodreau et al. 2009), which is the simplest network structure that represents the advantage of a closed network (Carpenter et al. 1998). This pattern of connection, i.e., closed clusters, generates a network of interdependent social exchanges wherein certain people become trusted exchange partners, conceivably in distinction from a distrusted third party, who can be called upon for resources and support (Oh et al. 2004), and thus, is often associated with social capital in which organizations know each other “providing extensive redundancy and cross-checking of information within the closed group” (Berardo and Scholz 2010, 636).

In a similar vein, as expressed by Putnam (1995), Coleman (1988), and Goodreau et al. (2009), Cranmer et al. (2012b) triadic closure, i.e., closed networks, might be an appealing attribute of a collaboration network due to the very nature of collaborative relations in peace operations. Put differently, in peace operations risk of failure appears to be high (judged in part by the frequency of resumed hostilities), and so is the potential defection of stakeholders.

Group theory analysts suggest that actors cooperate for the common good from which they foresee and obtain benefit (Richardson 1993). Yet whereas collective action theorists challenge this argument by noting that actors may be able to benefit from collaboration without actually engaging in cooperation, in other words, when they can free-ride (due to the greater commitment of some coalition leaders) or when they can obtain

private goods (as in the classic “stag hunt” fable, when hunters defect from an agreement to share a slain deer when they come upon or trap their own small game [Rousseau (1754), as cited in Skyrms (2001)]), they might choose to opt out.

While scholars generally agree that social networks afford important benefits to the members, they tend to disagree on which network patterns maximize these benefits. For some, as expressed earlier, collective action dilemmas can be overcome by forming dense, clustered, redundant and overlapping links among network actors (Berardo and Scholz 2010). Yet Burt (1992), for example, pursues a different line of reasoning and contends that networks rich in “structural holes”—i.e., open structured networks—signify access to mutually unconnected partners or isolates, and, thus, are able to obtain and perhaps share many distinct information flows. The structural holes, consequently, minimize the flow of redundant information among network partners, and generate an information-rich and efficient network (Burt 1992). Therefore, for Burt (1992), structural holes are better for network actors as they would facilitate information flow since the broker(s) will enable actors on either side of the structural hole to have access to information.

On the contrary, in his seminal article “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital”, Coleman (1988) notes that closed structures and networks in which nodes are densely tied to each other will provide the opportunity to convey needed resources and information. These closed networks, as they provide the information about network partners and their intentions, will motivate actors to treat each other in positive ways and hence enable them to develop trusting relationships that consequently might improve the effectiveness of the group’s collaborative efforts (Oh et al. 2004). Additionally, for Coleman (1990), Bourdieu (1986), and Putnam (1993), closed networks facilitate the access to social capital which helps to develop shared norms, and values among network members, and

information flow about their behavior, and therefore, are “indispensable in reducing the costs of negotiation between partners” (Todeva and Knoke 2005, 11). These closed networks may also facilitate share of information and experience about dealing effectively with a problem or problems to be solved.

Closed social structures are not only desired to generate effective norms but also “for another form of social capital: the trustworthiness of social structures that allows the proliferation of obligations and expectations” (Coleman 1988, 107). Accordingly, as expressed by Putnam (1995), densely connected structures would enable “maintaining credible commitments to collective solutions” (as cited in Lee et al. 2011, 565). With this respect, these closed structures enable the predictability of behavior of network partners, and constrain self-seeking opportunism (Walker et al. 1997).

Echoing earlier work, Cranmer et al. (2012b) note that closed triangles are favored as “commitments are more credible and communal security is better maximized than with other structures” (Cranmer et al. 2012b, 302). This indeed creates a “synergy” effect in alliance networks among states as well as IGOs that will afford higher expected utility to each stakeholder in the triad than “would be generated from a dyadic alliance that did not close a triangle” (Cranmer et al. 2012b, 302).

Hence even though alliances and collaborations present many opportunities for cheating, and free-riding; the development of trust, which contributes to the formation of social capital, will reduce the risk of opportunism, and consequently successful alliances (Olk and Earley 2000). As “trust is central to enduring and productive relational exchanges” (Robson et al. 2008, 647), while it facilitates cooperation among stakeholders, its absence complicates it (Harsch 2015).

As stated earlier, the social capital literature underscores "a cognitive component, trust, which can emerge to support cooperation within the repeated interactions of closed groups" (Berardo and Scholz 2010, 636-637). This reasoning represents an alternative justification for the formation of a transitive triad:

> "Since E is already a trusted source of information for A and D is a trusted source for E, E is in a position to assure A of D's trustworthiness. Furthermore, D is constrained from providing untimely or unreliable information to A because doing so may also affect D's relationship with E. According to this vision, if actor A is most concerned with finding trustworthy policy contacts, then the link with D—the only possibility for forming a transitive triad— would be the preferred choice" (Berardo and Scholz 2010, 636-637).

In short, endogenous mechanisms originate from the structuralist assumptions that the "selection of relationships, the maintenance of existing ones, the dissolution of old ones are conditioned by trust, information, and opportunities for interactions that are structured by the network" (Rivera et al. 2010, 98).

This analysis leads, therefore, to the following hypothesis regarding the likely pattern of IGO network formation:

**Hypothesis 1**: A preference of IGOs to form dense and closed networks, i.e., triadic closure, will manifest in the inter-organizational networking of peace operations.

*Prior Collaboration (Memory)*

In relation to the point made earlier about organizational learning, while network effects and organizational attributes have straightforward appeal to explain the formation of inter-organizational collaboration in peace operations, they do not account for the effects of prior collaboration among IGOs. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) suggest that literature on networks should take the accumulation of prior ties between organizations into account in order to explain the formation of new inter-organizational ties (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999) and persistence of prior ties.

Evolutionary theories (McKelvey 1997) point out that “inertia alone would predict that a tie between actors at a previous point in time would increase the tendency of the tie to be maintained at a subsequent point in time” (Contractor et al. 2006, 292-293). In line with evolutionary theories, empirical studies on alliance formation have reported that organizations with prior collaboration (in general) are more likely to collaborate (Gulati 1995; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999) since prior relations among organizations form a network structure in which most organizations can be embedded. Such networks shape the flow of information about capabilities, reliability and trustworthiness of the organizations in the network as well as new potential collaborators (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999, as cited in Gulati et al. 2002).

Prior collaboration among organizations enables the formation of new ties through three means: timing, access, and referrals. Timing requires acquiring informational benefits about the potential partners at the right time. Access represents information about potential and current partners regarding their trustworthiness and capabilities. And referrals are particularly important in formation of collaborative relations since organizations may refer their existing partners to other organizations “for partnering or to enter three-way partnerships” (Gulati et al. 2002, 282).

Additionally, repeated collaborations augment mutual learning through creation of norms, values and common practices among collaborating partners (Gulati et al. 2002). Prior experience, furthermore, enhances trust since it breeds over time, and will not be manifest in first encounter (Hardin 2002). Trust (and presumably the converse, distrust) arises to “substitute for formal protections against the fear of being ripped off” (Todeva and Knoke 2005, 14) and serves a guarantee against potential partner opportunism (Todeva and Knoke 2005).

Trust emerges in a partnership when the parties of the network have successfully completed transactions (Ring and Van de Ven 1994) and view collaboration partners as acting in "good faith and complying with the norms of equity" (Barringer and Harrison 2000, 371). Put differently, had the previous partnership completed successfully, partners would be willing to persist their relations in the future, and would be more reluctant to engage in opportunist and self-serving, i.e., defecting, behavior (Maitland et al. 1985; Okamura and Vonortas 2004; Okamura 2008).

Trust not only engenders a shared understanding but also a higher level of knowledge transfer between the collaboration partners (Okamura 2008). Trust among partners, furthermore, allows organizations to access partners' resources and to solve their problems when things do not work out as planned. Hence it enriches an organization's "ability to compete and overcome problems" (Uzzi 1997, 43).

As Balas (2011) suggests, trust is central for the formation and maintenance of inter-organizational collaboration, particularly on such "sensitive issues as peace operations" (Balas 2011, 28) where many lives—those of IGO personnel and those of local populations—are at stake. Lack of trust among peacekeeping IGOs is viewed to be one of the obstacles that discourage them from forming partnerships in the conflict zones. Paucity of NATO-EU cooperation prior to the Berlin Plus Agreement (2002), e.g., in Bosnia, for instance, was considered to be associated with lack of trust between these two organizations (Balas 2011).

In addition to the role of trust for forging cooperation, indirect links might account for collaborative ties among organizations. Common previous partners might facilitate or hamper the formation of alliances (Zirulia 2011). These previous collaborators play two roles. First, they provide information about potential partners for the formation of new collaboration

opportunities. Second, previous network partners reduce the "the asymmetric information among the potential partners, providing an indirect reputation effect" (Zirulia 2011, 61).

As noted earlier, prior collaborations would help organizations to gain familiarity with their staffs as well as bureaucratic, institutional and organizational culture, function and systems, and learn lessons from their previous cooperation, thus maximizing the benefits of mutual resource sharing and apportioned mission responsibilities. While trust takes time to develop, once trust is built it is to a great extent stable and "difficult to break" (Krackhardt 1994, 220).

As such, I hypothesize that:

**Hypothesis 2**: IGOs that have collaborated in a prior time period are more likely to collaborate.

**Exogenous Explanatory Factors**

In addition to network effects, i.e., endogenous explanations, the MTML model incorporates exogenous factors, e.g., organizational attributes that can account for the emergence of networks (Monge and Contractor 2003; Contractor et al. 2006). These will be considered in order.

*Homophily*

Theories of homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; McPherson et al. 2001) contend that actors associate themselves with similar others as they will seek out those that are like themselves. In a similar vein, in his experimental study on inter-group relations, Sherif (1958) asserts that individuals tend to select others who are similar since "by doing so they reduce the potential areas of conflict in the relationship" (Monge and Contractor 2001, 477). Shared beliefs, or belief systems among actors make networks coherent, and "can be seen as a precondition for actors with shared policy

preferences to coordinate their actions and build common strategies" (Ingold 2011; as cited in Fischer et al. 2012, 443).[8]

The principle of homophily implies that distance with regard to social or organizational characteristics translate into network distance, the number of ties, connections, "through which a piece of information must travel to connect two individuals" (McPherson et al. 2001, 416). Echoing this argument, alliance formation theories contend that alliances are formed among nations, which share similar international policy preferences (Smith 1995). Similarly, organizations are expected to choose the ones that are similar to themselves regarding characteristics, such as status similarity, including organizational function, cultures norms and values (Monge and Contractor 2003; Shumate et al. 2005; Atouba and Shumate 2015).

Therefore, at the dyadic level, there is a greater tendency for similar actors to form mutual ties (Monge and Contractor 2003). Additionally, at the triadic level, in conjunction with homophily perspective, theories of generalized exchange and cognitive balance posit that "there is a greater tendency for cyclical ties among actors who share similar attributes" (Contractor et al. 2006, 691), e.g., similar organizational functions or types. Segil's (1998) research into two hundred companies found that seventy-five percent of these companies reported that alliance failure was caused by incompatibility of organizational and corporate cultures. For such companies managing the cultural differences and similarities between alliances partners is viewed as one of the most crucial elements of successful alliances. They, therefore, consider cultural compatibility a top priority in their relationships (Segil 1998; 1999). For instance, it is often noted that having a reputation as a military organization composed of nominal democracies, it can be problematic for NATO to coordinate with non-military or politically heterogeneous actors, e.g., the OSCE, since that organization is "less

[8] This could be a factor hampering cooperation between Anglophone and Francophone institutions in Western African peace missions as well.

aware of the civilian dimensions of crisis management, and reluctant to become coordinated itself, while aiming to coordinate others" (Major and Molling 2009, 26). While inter-organizational collaborations provide mechanisms to deal with problems such as environmental instability and uncertainty, they are plagued with complicated problems such as transaction costs. The organizational economics literature notes that transaction costs frequently increase since heterogeneous actors in a potential collaboration have conflicting interests that can increase information, negotiation and enforcement costs (Lee et al., 2012). In this sense, collaborations between organizations with institutional, organizational, structural, and particularly cultural similarities are favored as compared to such collaborations with dissimilar organizations in order to reduce collaboration hazards (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny 1994) or transaction costs (Feiock and Scholz, 2010; Lubell, 2007). As a strategic behavior to minimize transaction costs (Feiock & Scholz 2010) or to reduce collaboration hazards (Gulati & Gargiulo 1999; Podolny 1994), organizations in general select partners who have intrinsic similarities. This argument would still hold even if there were relatively few potential partners to choose from, as in peace mission deployed in internal armed conflicts, since coordination problems would presumably outweigh decision of convenience. While cooperation across sectors is still a key element to successful inter-organizational (inter-sectoral) collaboration, both governments and nongovernmental entities also have been seen to partner with others possessing a similar organizational type. That is, in addition to similarity of organizational function, homophily with regard to organizational type, coded as regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations, may determine if two IGOs would forge collaborative relations in the field since organizations with similar organizational structure and bureaucracies would have a better understanding of how these

organizations operate and decisions are made as organizational similarity promotes a common understanding between IGOs and will help them to sort out their differences.

These lead to the following hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 3:** IGOs sharing the same organizational function are more likely to collaborate in conducting peace operations.

**Hypothesis 4:** IGOs sharing the same organizational type, i.e., regional, sub-regional, or extra-regional, are more likely to collaborate in peace operations.

*Theories of Exchange and Resource Dependence*

One of the biggest obstacles to enhanced involvement of regional and sub-regional organizations in peace operations has been the lack of capacity to launch such operations as they involve "more than just the technical training and equipping of individuals and light infantry force for peacekeeping" (The Challenges Project 2005, 18).

Given that sufficient financial, material and human resources can be lacking in peace operations, it is difficult for IGOs to undertake such missions without collaboration with other organizations (Morrison and Blair 1999; UNU-CRIS 2008). Conducting multifunctional missions with many complementary aspects, such as the provision of essential enabling capabilities and heavy equipment in order to launch and maintain efficient and effective operations, (The Challenges Project 2005) thus can require IGOs to pool their assets and to focus on "modular" missions rather than relying on parallel command systems (Gowan and Sherman 2012).

During modular missions each IGO undertakes a different task, complementing each other in terms of human and financial resources. By doing so, they mobilize and utilize their resources more effectively. Therefore while theories of homophily suggest that actors are more likely to forge ties with those who share similar attributes, such as organizational

function, theories of exchange (Blau 1964), which attempt to explain human action as a calculus of exchange of information and resources, "posit ties among actors who differ in certain attributes" (Contractor et al. 2006, 690), mutually complementing each other.

IGOs such as the AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Arab League cannot carry out peace missions on their own, and thus turn to organizations with significant additional capacity such as the EU, NATO and the UN for assets, e.g., heavy airlift, medical supplies and facilities, training and information gathering. To illustrate, though the AU has launched peace missions in the field for about a decade, it "has often struggled to get the equipment it needs and to build up headquarters" (Gowan and Sherman 2012, 2). Its mission in Darfur, for instance, received support from various extra-regional organizations, such as the EU, NATO and UN, and was converted into a hybrid AU-UN mission in 2008 (Gowan and Sherman 2012, 2).

As noted earlier, complementarity plays an essential role in driving organizations to forge social ties. According to resource dependence and exchange theories, organizations fabricate ties on the basis of their need to obtain material and financial resources and access information from other organizations and of "their ability to provide their own valuable material, informational resources in exchange" (Atouba and Shumate 2010, 296; Aldrich and Prefer 1974; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

An organization forms alliances and partnerships with other organizations to "plug a skill or resource gap" (Barringer and Harrison 2000, 373). Specialization and differentiation among organizations' networks arise from the difficulty of any single organization "achieving self-sufficiency, thus requiring most organizations to enter into transactions (e.g., collaboration) with others to obtain resources that cannot be generated internally" (Aldrich

1976, 421). Put differently, forming partnerships with other organizations is the most practical alternative to obtain needed resources (Mitchell and Singh 1996) and even to survive.

Resource acquisition, therefore, becomes the major driving force behind the emergence of inter-organizational relations (Van de Ven et al. 1975; Aldrich 1976; Dietrich 1994), which, consequently, leads to "supplementary as well as complementary relations with other organizations" (Aldrich 1976, 425). Hence organizations seek to minimize power differentials in their relationships with other organizations to reduce uncertainty in their relations, and to enhance their organizational performance (Gulati and Singh 2007) through the use of exchange ties (Atouba and Shumate 2010, 307).

Empirical findings have verified many of these suppositions. Research on inter-organizational collaborations had found that organizations forge ties with other organizations which have complementary capabilities and resources (Oliver 1990; Powell et al. 1996, Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Barringer and Harrison 2000; Okamura and Venerates 2004; Park and Mezias 2005), since as Hamel et al. (1989) suggest, for collaboration to be successful and effective each partner must contribute something distinctive. Thus by sharing resources through networking, organizations not only focus on their comparative advantages (Alagappa 1999; Murdie 2013) but also avoid duplication of efforts by dividing their labor and responsibilities (Murdie 2013). Additionally, collaborations help organizations to learn from each other (Hamel et al. 1989; Hamel 1991; Khanna et al. 1998) and to utilize partnerships to build new skills and technologies, which will be diffused throughout the organization. Alliances enhance the capacity and capabilities of alliance partners against outsiders, and curtail the costs and risks of entering new businesses or markets (Hamel et al. 1989). In addition to intentional learning of skills and techniques, in peace missions IGOs may also

learn by trial and error with each other, evolving more effective practices and operations across repeated collaborations.

The cooperation between NATO and the UN in Afghanistan epitomizes how complementary of capabilities result in an increased collaboration among stakeholders. As of 2008, the increasingly dangerous and complex Afghani operational environment led NATO and the UN to enhance their collaboration. The NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) reportedly viewed the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan's (UNAMA) legitimacy as necessary to muster domestic support, while UNAMA needed ISAF's military and logistical capabilities to be able to operate and execute its tasks in unstable parts of the country (Harsch 2015).

In short, even though organizations with a similar policy and ideological focus might be more likely to form ties with one another (homophily), we might also expect that organizations possessing different resource capacities, including the reputational advantages appropriate to certain missions and zones of operation, have a propensity to forge collaborative ties. For instance, even though the UN to a large extent is capable of generating resources and deploying civilian capabilities in addition to military ones, the organization is in need of high-tech capabilities, such as attack helicopters and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets (Lijn et al. 2015), which are often provided by NATO or the EU.

Incorporating these theories the following, and in effect rival hypothesis emerges:

**Hypothesis 5**: IGOs with contrasting resource capacity—resource level heterophily—are more likely to collaborate in peace operations.

*Proximity and Geographical Region-Based Homophily*

Proximity breeds formation of ties. The law of propinquity (Allen 1977; Krackhardt 1994) posits, “the probability of two people communicating is inversely proportional to the distance between them” (Krackhardt 1994, 213). Physical proximity among partners affords them “an ability to exercise influence in a way that the more distant partner is unable to achieve” (Glaister et al. 2004, 62) as close geographical presence provides the opportunity to develop regular contact (Glaister et al. 2004). Similarly, organizations located in the same geographical region, i.e., geographically homophilous, are expected to be more likely to engage in collaboration relations as geographical homophily, not only facilitate the formation of ties but also the persistence of them. In other words, proximity and geographical region-based homophily influence “the persistence of social ties by moderating the effort required to maintain relationships” (Rivera et al. 2010, 106).

It has been shown that proximity engenders ties among organizations, firms, companies as well as states. In *Origins of Alliances*, Walt (1987), for instance, suggests that states located in the same geographical regions and/or in close proximity are more likely to form alliances since they will recognize and are affected by the same regional threats and form alliances to deter them, thus banding together for common security (Walt 1987; also see Gibler and Vasquez 1998). Should we apply this reasoning to the case of collaboration between extra-regional, regional and sub-regional organizations, we would expect that organizations in close proximity and located in the same geographical region would be more likely to collaborate as they “live with the consequences of unresolved conflicts and cannot simply withdraw from them. The EU and NATO collaboration in Bosnia is a case in point” (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006, 230).

Organizational studies suggest that proximity also lessens the cost of information flow (Boschma 2005; Ter Wal 2014) and facilitates, and thus, increases personal contacts in

inter-firm or inter-organizational relations (Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003; Atouba and Shumate 2010). Furthermore, proximity increases resource efficiency. To illustrate, the UN has reported to increase its resource efficiency by promoting burden sharing, and cooperating with regional and sub-regional organizations (The Challenges Project 2005, 19).

As much as regional cooperation is desired since it would reduce information and transaction costs associated with inter-organizational collaboration, its absence could result in protracted conflicts and failed peace missions. Syria is a case in point; *inter alia*, the lack of cooperation among regional organizations such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Organizations of the Islamic Conference in 2014-2015, due in part to regional political rivalries and polarization, not only impaired their credibility but also presumably emboldened the Assad Regime and other extremist groups in the region. Although proximity theories and geographical region-based homophily are similar, the latter describes a tendency to select others in "a larger space or geographic area than those in which proximity mechanisms traditionally operate" (Atouba and Shumate 2015, 590).

In light of the theoretical ground for expecting a relationship between proximity and geographical region-based homophily, and organizational behavior, I pose the following hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 6**: IGOs headquartered in the same geographical region are more likely to collaborate.

**Hypothesis 7**: Proximity should positively predict the inter-organizational collaboration among IGOs in peace operations.

*Prior Bad Experience*

Though prior collaborative relations may determine if IGOs would collaborate in the future or these collaborative links will persist, how the prior collaboration has resulted—

whether it was a bad or good experience, good and bad news effect (Pearson et al. (2013), may account for if two IGOs will retain their partnership.

The inertia in deployment of peace operations in the late 1990s has often been associated with the failures and violence inflicted upon peacekeepers in Somalia, Rwanda and Srebrenica in the early 1990s. For instance, it is noted that the US, though it is not an IGO, has become reluctant to deploy forces and engage in peace missions following the failed US peacekeeping and enforcement mission in Somalia in 1993 (Babarinde 1993).

Even though analysts find that peace operations are becoming less dangerous (Lijn and Smit 2015), peacekeepers remain to be targets of attacks by extremists and terrorist groups, as was the case in Mali and Central African Republic, and were held hostages by jihadis (e.g., in Syria) (Lijn and Smit 2015). The demand for peace operations continue, so does the demand for effective peacekeeping. Although IGOs would continue to deploy peacekeepers in conflict zones, they may strive not to repeat collaborations that have been ineffective and in which they have suffered high number of casualties. Expressed differently, it should be expected that organizational dyads that have suffered great losses, *prior bad experience*, would be reluctant to repeat their collaborations in the future.

Therefore, while collaborative relations that have been good experiences and viewed as successes (with regard to safety and security of peacekeepers) would be more likely to be repeated, IGOs would eschew retaining their partnerships with the organizations with which their prior collaborative efforts suffered heavy losses and viewed as failures in that regard.

**Hypothesis 8**: Collaborations between IGO dyads that are considered as bad experiences would be less likely to be repeated.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided a detailed theoretical framework to explore the factors that motive the formation, evolution and dissolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs engaged in peace operations, and laid out a series of hypotheses relating to both network formation and mission success. The following chapters present findings regarding the determinants of inter-organizational collaboration in peace operations and discuss how these peace operation networks; their structural properties and composition might be associated with the success/failure of peace missions.

# CHAPTER 3 TESTING THE THEORY OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION

## Introduction

Previous chapters argued that collaboration among intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in peace operations can be thought of as a network process and the factors that may determine the formation of these collaborative relations can be examined in a network perspective. This chapter studies the role of network effects and exogenous covariates, such as organizational resource capacity, function, and organizational type, in accounting for the formation, evolution—small changes occurring between the consecutively observed networks (Snijders 2005, 215)—and dissolution of partnerships and collaborative links among IGOs in conducting peace operations. In subsequent chapters we will examine the outcomes of these collaborative operations, i.e., how they affect the performance of peace operations.

This chapter proceeds as follows: first, the network research design, and discussion of exponential random graph models and their extension to temporal data models are provided; next, I consider the variables and model specification; then I deal with results and discussion of goodness of fit tests.

## Research Design

### *Exponential Random Graph Models*

One of this study's main contributions is demonstrating that relations among IGOs in conducting peace missions can be usefully studied by utilizing network analysis. In this regard, IGOs are considered nodes, and relationships among them, such as resource and information exchange, are termed links or ties, “represented as a line between the two points” (Desmarais et al. 2012, 288).

I estimate a model of network formation, evolution and dissolution, and fit an exponential random graph model (ERGM). The ERGM is a tie-focused statistical network model (Harris 2014) and a method that "is flexible enough to accommodate a wide range of theories of network generation" (Desmarais and Cranmer 2012, 403). That is, in addition to the effect of exogenous explanatory variables, such as organizational attributes, the ERGMs (aka p* models) examine "how the various endogenous characteristics of a matrix of network relations" (Wasserman and Pattison 1996, as cited in Monge and Contractor 2001, 488) can account for network outcomes, such as the formation of collaborative relations among IGOs in peace operations. The ERGMs therefore afford a flexible way to simulate features common in social networks, e.g., propensities for friend-of-a-friend triadic closure (Krivitsky 2012).

In other words, ERG models can incorporate different network configurations, such as mutual dyads, representing two ties "between the nodes, one going in one direction and the other going in the opposite direction" (Wasserman and Faust 1994, 124), into a model and examine which processes account for the formation of the network structure (Lusher and Robins 2013). To illustrate, the ERGMs can address questions such as "whether in the observed network there are significantly more, or less, structural characteristics of interest than expected by chance" (Robins et al. 2007, 175). These structural characteristics, e.g., presence of dyadic relations, triadic ties, and centralization, can be viewed as the outcomes of local social processes that formed the examined network (Robins et al. 2007), and illustrate the changing patterns of IGO partnerships in executing peace operations.

The use of regression methods on IGO collaborations violates the critical assumption of observational independence that these models require. That is, should a dyad of IGOs conditions its alliance behavior on the behavior of other dyads of IGOs, then the basic

assumption that allows for the creation of joint likelihood is violated (Cranmer et al. 2012a). Regression models furthermore are not robust to the violation of independence assumptions stem from relational data. The main problem is that when independence assumption is violated, "regression models are biased in a way that can lead the researcher to believe that covariates have much stronger effects on the outcome of interest than they actually do" (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 282).

Different from traditional regression models, ERGMs move away from independence assumptions. By doing so, these models make modeling relational data and network effects (endogenous variables), such as triadic closure, possible. Thus, "the key difference in the way one must think of inference in an ERGM context versus a regression context is that the ERGM treats the entire network as a single observation" (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 292). That is to say, though treating each dyadic link or pair (of IGOs) as a conditionally independent observation, an ERG model "considers the whole network of ties to be one observation from a complex multivariate distribution—thus making it completely free of independence assumptions—and then asks what the probability of observing that network is compared to a random network with the same number of nodes" (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 292-293). That is, ERG models treat the observed network as the dependent variable, e.g., presence/absence of collaborative relations among a set of actors, and fit structural parameters—endogenous effects— and covariates—exogenous effects—to explain formation and structure of the network (Prell 2012).

More broadly, ERGMs allow analysts to incorporate assumptions of interdependence (Lubell et al. 2012), and thereby assess whether the network structure, such as presence of dense clusters, or absence of closed triangles, are unique features of the network studied, or

a result of a random process (Cranmer et al. 2012b). In this way we should be able to discover the signature or likely structure and pattern of IGO networks in peace operations.

As noted above, ERGMs allow researchers to include two types of statistics/relations to account for network formation. Endogenous effects account for relational processes or local network configurations that are formed as a result of social structural processes (Wang et al. 2015). Endogenous variables can be operationalized to capture "theoretically interesting relational processes" (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 291), such as clustering that account for the formation of a specific network.

Exogenous effects/covariates, on the contrary, are the attributes, e.g., organizational security function or organizational type that significantly help explain network formation processes. For example, an analyst can include certain exogenous effects, such as race, gender, or age, to examine formation of friendship networks. Exogenous parameters, similar to regression coefficients, "give the effects of the respective network statistics on the likelihood of observing a particular realization of the network" (Desmarais and Cranmer 2012, 404). Should endogenous, i.e. network, effect not matter for formation of the network—e.g., there is no dyadic or relational property, the ERG model reduces to a logistic regression model in terms of the exogenous attributes (Krivitsky 2012); thus, "the parameters assigned to the covariate effects will be exactly equal to coefficients in a logistic regression" (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 294), and will be interpreted as such.

Thus a parameter coefficient generated by the ERGM is interpreted as a regression coefficient. Therefore, a positive parameter denotes the likelihood of observing networks with larger values of the statistic that we modeled than would be expected if "the network were drawn at random from a uniform distribution of networks" (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 293). Again, similar to regression coefficients, if the coefficient pertaining to the modeled parameter is

significant from zero, it can be interpreted as statistically significant. And thus, it significantly influences the probability of "observing a particular instance of that network, controlling for the other statistics in the analysis" (Cranmer et al. 2012a, 294).

In investigating the formation and evolution of IGO collaboration networks, I utilize a statistical method that analyzes and captures dynamic changes in these collaborative inter-IGO networks. The Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model (TERGM), an extension of ERG models to discrete time-series of networks—modeling networks that are observed at a number of discrete time points (Robins and Pattison 2001; Snijders 2005; Hanneke et el. 2010)—explains "higher-order inter-temporal dependence" (Cranmer et al. 2014, 9) in network structure. The TERGM can simultaneously test the formation, evolution and dissolution of networks (Hanneke et al. 2010, Cranmer et al. 2014) and model endogenous and exogenous covariate effects that drive the formation of such networks. Put differently, the TERGM makes it possible to model and estimate the structural properties of IGO collaboration networks over time without the independence assumption among independent variables of traditional statistical approaches.

**Model Specification and Variables**

Dependent Variable

This study examines the collaborative relations forged by IGOs engaged in peace operations between 1990-2013. The dependent variable is the adjacency matrix—network—of IGO collaborations in peace operations for each year under study. The adjacency matrix for a network with *n* actors—nodes, e.g., IGOs—is an *nXn* matrix whose each cell is "1" if two nodes have a tie, "0" if they do not.

In dynamic networks we suppose that we have *M* repeated observations on a network with the same set of *g* actors. The observed networks are represented with

adjacency matrices X ($t_m$) = ($X_{ij}$ ($t_m$)) for *m* = 1,…., M, where *i* and *j* range from 1 to *g*. In that sense, the variable $X_{ij}$ (t) denotes whether at time t there is a link from *i* to *j*—value 1— or not—value 0. And the adjacency matrix's diagonal is 0, $X_{ii}$(t) = 0 for all *i* (Snijders 2005).

I constructed adjacency matrices that represent the absence/presence of collaborative relations between IGOs engaged in peace missions for each year between 1990-2013. Data on inter-organizational collaboration among IGOs in peace operations are drawn from the Dyadic Multiple Simultaneous Peace Operations Dataset compiled by Balas (2011b), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Multilateral Peace Operations database, IGO reports, and briefings.

The unit of analysis is the presence (or absence) of collaborative relations in each IGO dyad (represented by each cell in the adjacency matrix) included in the model. As I examine and focus on 20 IGOs, there are 400 observations (cells in the adjacency matrix) for each year under study, and 24 years of observation results in 9600 total observations (N=9600).

Independent Variables

*Prior Collaboration (Memory)*

In the light of the theoretical premises and hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2 regarding the role of prior collaboration in inducing future collaborations, I include an autoregression statistic to examine whether current ties and network structures depend on previous ties, i.e., collaboration at a previous point in time which includes both the same or a different conflict. This statistic shows characteristics such as edge innovation, i.e., formation of new relationships/ties among IGOs, and edge loss—dissolution of ties— and thus, helps us determine whether previous ties, i.e., partnerships, collaborative relations, are carried forward and maintained. The dynamics of edge stability or "memory," as Desmarais and

Cranmer (2011) term it, indicate if ties in current time period are to be current edges (ties) carried over from the previous year. In other words, the memory term captures the persistence in collaborative ties (Desmarais and Cranmer 2011), and demonstrates whether the relations among IGOs either within the same operation or over different operations in peace operations endure.

*Triadic Closure*

It was hypothesized that closed triangles should be a feature of IGO networks in peace operations (a positive coefficient) since collaborations with high failure rate, such as peace operations, are conducive to defection and free-riding, and closed triangles and dense networks are regarded as a panacea for collective action problems (Berardo and Scholz 2010). Such closed network structures are believed to breed trust among network members (Coleman 1988). In order to capture this effect, I included a statistic that counts the number of closed triangles in IGO networks. The triadic closure parameter counts the number of triangles defined by IGO '*A*' having collaborations with IGO *'B'* and IGO 'C*'* when IGOs '*B'* and '*C'* are also collaborating with each other.

In relation to the point made earlier it is important to control for several exogenous covariates that the literature suggests should determine the formation, and evolution of inter-organizational networks. I include the organizational function, organizational type, and resource capacity as organizational attributes that may determine the formation and persistence of collaborative relations among IGOs in conducting peace operations.

*Organizational Function*

The model includes organizational function as one of the exogenous covariates to examine whether the formation and maintenance of the studied networks are driven by

homophily. Organizational function is coded for each organization based on the majority of activities they engage in conducting peace missions.[9]

Organizational function is coded for each organization based on the majority of activities they engage in conducting peace missions. I coded organizations as civilian, such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU), military, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and mixed organizations, e.g., African Union (AU) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).[10]

*Organizational Resource Capacity*

In order to examine the role of resource dependence and interdependence in determining the formation of ties among IGOs in peace operations, the model includes organizations' level of resource capacity as an exogenous covariate. For organizational capacity coding, albeit with some modifications, I relied on Pearson et al.'s (2013) operationalization of IGOs as large, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), mid-level, such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and limited capacity, such as Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC)[11], based on human and financial resource at their disposal. The data is derived from IGO websites and reports.

An absolute difference term is used to model the relationship between organizational resource capacity and formation of collaborative relations between IGOs. Absolute difference terms add one network statistic to the model equal to the sum of absolute difference between two IGOs' resource capacity for all nodes in the network (Morris et al. 2008). For

[9] This coding is similar to Balas' (2011b) operationalization of organizational security culture.
[10] There are 13 civilian, 2 military and 5 mixed IGOs.
[11] There are 3 large, 6 mid-level and 11 limited capacity organizations.

instance, as a limited capacity organization IGAD is coded "1" and ECOWAS is coded "2" as an organization with mid-level capacity. And the absolute difference term included in the model accounts for this difference, that is, "1," with regard to these organizations' resource capacity level.

Thus, I expect that coefficient estimate for resource capacity would be positive, suggesting a heterophily effect, i.e., formation of collaborative relations between IGOs with different resource capacity.

*Organizational Type*

Organizations are coded as regional IGOs, such as African Union (AU), sub-regional IGOs, e.g., Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), and extra-regional organizations, such as NATO and the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP).[12][13]

*Proximity and Geographical Region-Based Homophily*

Drawing on the law of propinquity and theories of homophily, the model also includes the physical distance between IGO headquarters, i.e., proximity of headquarters, as an explanatory variable.[14] The latitude and longitude of cities are used as coordinates to calculate the distance between two IGO headquarters.

Additionally, the model takes the geographical region-based homophily into account to capture if IGOs located in the same geographical region are more likely to collaborate. The geographical regions in which IGOs are headquartered are coded as: Africa, Europe, Americas, Middle East, and Asia and the Pacific.

[12] The UN is coded as an extra-regional organization.
[13] There are 4 regional, 11 sub-regional, and 5 extra-regional organizations.
[14] I do not model the distance between the IGO headquarters and the conflict country.

I expect a negative effect for geographical distance indicator, suggesting that the greater the distance between two IGOs, the less likely they would collaborate. On the contrary, I expect a positive relationship between IGO collaborations and geographical region-based homophily.

*Prior Bad Experience*

The number of casualties suffered by IGO dyads per year is used as a proxy for determining a bad experience effect. The casualty data are drawn from the UN Fatalities Statistics (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/fatalities.shtml) and SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations database.

*Isolates*

Furthermore, an isolate term is included in the model as I expect to find that a considerable number of IGOs, though their mandates include protecting regional/international peace and security, are not geared toward collaborating with other IGOs even if they deploy coincident missions. The isolate term adds one statistic to the model equal to the number of isolates in a given network. Isolates are denoted as the nodes with degree zero, i.e., with no ties, suggesting they participate in peace operations but do not collaborate with other IGOs (Morris et al. 2008).

**Table 3.1. Independent Variables and Expected Effect**

| Network Dynamics | Level | Expected Effect |
|---|---|---|
| *Endogenous Effects* | | |
| Prior Collaboration (Memory) | Network | + |
| Triadic Closure | Network | + |
| *Exogenous Effects* | | |
| Organizational Function | Dyad | + |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Organizational Resource Capacity Heterophily | Dyad | + |
| Organizational Type Homophily | Dyad | + |
| Prior Bad Experience | Dyad | - |
| Proximity | Dyad | - |
| Geographical Region-Based Homophily | Dyad | + |
| Isolates | Network | + |

Table 3.1 provides a summary of the variables and network effects included in the model, and at which level these variables are measured. The table also demonstrates the direction of the effect I expect these variables to have on IGO collaboration network.

**Results**

*Why Do Intergovernmental Organizations Collaborate in Peace Operations?*

Analytical results partially confirm the hypotheses laid out in previous chapter (Chapter 2). The results from the TERGM model (see Table 3.2) confirm the expectations with regard to the structural properties of IGO collaboration networks in peace operations. As I hypothesized, in addition to the role of organizational attributes (modeled as exogenous covariates), endogenous factors, i.e., triadic closure and memory effect representing prior collaborations, account for the formation and persistence of inter-organizational collaboration among IGOs in peace operations. Hypothesis 1 expected to find that IGOs would be likely to form dense and closed networks in conducting peace operations. The coefficient for triadic closure parameter is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that a friend-of-a-friend mechanism does play a role in partnering with other organizations in undertaking peace operations' tasks. For instance, NATO has "exerted its military muscles in several operations since the end of the Cold War in Europe" (Dominguez 2011, 75) and outside of its primary

region of concern, such as Africa. In the majority of African peacekeeping efforts, however, the collaboration between NATO and African regional organizations has been through the UN. NATO has "contributed to UN efforts in African capacity building" (Koops and Tardy 2015, 66), and collaborated with the African regional and sub-regional organizations through logistical and military support provided to the UN's African missions.

Finally my estimate with regard to the prior relationships, i.e., *memory effect*, provides a strong support for the importance of prior relationships to account for persistence of partnerships.

This finding indicates that prior collaborations to some extent help IGOs to get familiar with their bureaucracies, norms and how things are run and done, which presumably enhances the possibility of future cooperation. More specifically, the results suggest that once partnership is formed between the two IGOs, it is likely to be maintained, i.e., carried over, including collaborations from year to year and mission to mission. Expressed differently, once initiated, these inter-organizational partnerships are rarely reversed or dissolve following their initiation (Haugevik 2007). Indeed, Haugevick (2007) argues that the inter-organizational relationships among IGOs, such as NATO and UN cooperation in Kosovo, AU-UN partnership in Sudan and Burundi, involve a certain degree of *path-dependency*, that is, "once the choice to cooperate has been made, it is difficult to turn back, due to the time, resources and prestige already invested" (Haugevik 2007, 7) even if IGOs sometimes may withdraw once their particular job has been done or accomplished.

**Table 3.2. Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models, 1990-2013**

| Network Dynamics | Coefficient Estimates | Standard Error |
|---|---|---|
| *Endogenous Effects* | | |
| Prior Collaboration (Memory) | 3.137*** | 0.241 |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Triadic Closure | 1.529*** | 0.188 |
| *Exogenous Effects* | | |
| Organizational Function Homophily | -0.171 | 0.196 |
| Organizational Resource Capacity Heterophily | 0.314* | 0.218 |
| Organizational Type Homophily | -0.454* | 0.220 |
| Prior Bad Experience | 0.008. | 0.005 |
| Proximity | 0.01** | 0.003 |
| Geographical Region-Based Homophily | 0.090 | 0.253 |
| Isolates | 1.937*** | 0.193 |

(Notes. Statistical significance: <0 '***'>, <0.001 '**'>, <0.01 '*'>, <0.05 '.'>, <0.1 ' ' 1.>, N=9600)

Hypothesis 3 stated that IGOs sharing similar attributes, which will be manifest in organizational function, would be more likely to collaborate as opposed to the ones with different organizational functions. Interestingly, I do not find any significant support for this hypothesis. Nor is the coefficient in the hypothesized direction. Indeed, some analysts note that complementarity, rather than the similarity, of organizational functions may lead to collaboration on the ground between two IGOs. Organizations with different security cultures also may be deployed to handle different aspects and phases of peace operations. In Kosovo, for instance, while OSCE (a civilian organization) carried out institution building and democratization, the UN (a civilian and military organization) has undertaken tasks such as

humanitarian assistance and civilian administration, and NATO (a military organization) launched a military campaign (Solana 1999).[15] Therefore, complementary organizational functions rather than the similar ones might be more desirable for organizations to forge ties, and presumably to conduct more effective missions.

Another finding of note relates to assumptions about organizational type homophily. I expected that similar organizations in regard to their type, i.e., regional, sub-regional, and extra-regional, would be more likely to collaborate because they would be more familiar with their bureaucracies, decision making schemes, and policies, as well as local conditions. Yet, the coefficient is negative (and statistically significant) suggesting that heterophily, not homophily in terms of organizational type, induces collaborative relations among peacekeeping IGOs.

This negative coefficient may not be surprising given the fact that on the one hand, many of these sub-regional or regional organizations may lack either military muscles or financial and human resources and capabilities to deploy peace operations on their own; thus, they would call upon assistance from IGOs with required capacities. On the other hand, extra-regional IGOs, such as the UN, often seek out assistance from regional and sub-regional organizations as they afford legitimacy to muster regional and local, and even international support.

Hypothesis 5 posited that organizational attributes regarding organizational resource capacity would indeed present a heterophily effect, indicating that since many organizations may lack resources to carry out peace operations' tasks, they would be more likely to team up with organizations with mid-level or high capacity. As expected, the coefficient for this resource capacity parameter is positive (as it shows the difference between resource levels),

[15] All of these missions were assumed to be well coordinated and they checked out with each other.

and statistically significant. The direction of the relationship—the positive coefficient—may be interpreted as providing evidence for theories of resource dependence and exchange. As expressed earlier, resource dependency and exchange theories posit that organizations form ties on the basis of their comparative advantages and need for resources. In inter-organizational peace operations networking, the need for cooperation arises in part due to the fact that one IGO cannot necessarily provide all resources required to carry out multidimensional peace missions.

The majority of IGOs, e.g., Asian, African regional and sub-regional organizations, lack military capabilities, management and operational capacities to tackle regional peace and security challenges (Holt and Shanahan 2005). Hence they have to work with and rely on other IGOs to improve their capabilities to be able to address security questions in their respective regions and finance their operations. As Koops and Tardy (2015) underscore, the UN is the theoretical interlocutor for any peace operation. Collaborations between the UN and regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations are generally marked by asymmetries regarding the level of organizational resource capacity. Sometimes these differences have even reportedly led to inter-organizational frictions, as when African peacekeeping troops were paid less than their counterparts from outside the region.

On the one hand, the UN contributes to peacekeeping IGOs, particularly the ones in Africa, which suffer from a capability deficit in capacity-building (Koops and Tardy 2015). On the other hand, the UN's deployment in multidimensional missions, e.g., ones in Afghanistan, or Sudan, which entail "robust forces, air and sea transport, and aerial reconnaissance capabilities" (Harsch and Varwick 2009, 31) are supported by IGOs, such as NATO and the EU, that can deliver required capabilities. NATO, for instance, offered its support to the UN-

AU hybrid mission in Darfur (UNAMID) that succeeded the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) on January 2008 (Dominguez 2011, 69).

Along the same lines, both regional organizations and the UN require each other's support and resources. As the UN is experiencing a decline in its power and authority owing to its image as being unrepresentative and biased for much of the world (Lyman 2000), it needs support from regional bodies and arrangements (Hettne and Soderbaum 2006). To illustrate, in addition to its civilian missions deployed alongside the UN—missions in Kosovo and Bosnia—the EU has launched three military operations to support UN peacekeeping missions in Congo, i.e., EUFOR RD Congo and "Artemis", and in Chad, EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Koops and Tardy 2015).

The evidence is mixed on whether proximity and geographical region-based homophily determine the formation of collaborative relations among IGOs. Contrary to my expectation, while being headquartered in the same geographical region is positively related to forming relationships among IGOs, the coefficient estimate is very small (0.09) and does not reach statistical significance. In addition to the role of being located in the same geographical region, the positive though weak coefficient may be attributed to the number of member states shared by IGO dyads. Given that IGOs are composed of and often act on behalf of their member states, and policy disagreements among members are viewed as causes of non-deployment or non-collaboration, it would be easier for the IGOs located in the same geographical region to forge consensus to form an alliance or partnership. Shared member states would presumably result in a convergence in IGOs' preferences and policy decisions as well.[16]

[16] The model was also run with the number of shared member states each dyad possesses yet the model was degenerate, therefore, results with shared member states are not reported.

In addition to geographical region-based homophily, I posited that proximity, captured by the real distance between headquarters of two organizations, would affect their collaboration decisions. The coefficient is weak but statistically significant; yet, contrary to my expectation, distance between two organizations' headquarters is positively related to collaboration, suggesting that proximity, not geographical region-based homophily, may be a better predictor of IGO cooperation, especially given the results we have seen linking IGOs at extra-regional, regional and sub-regional levels.

Another explanation for this result might be that proliferation of regional and sub-regional arrangements, particularly in Africa and Asia, in the last two decades, albeit initially viewed as a welcome development, led to dispersal of already scarce resources, contradiction of policies, competition and duplication of efforts (Tavares 2009), especially at sub-regional level. Regional and sub-regional IGOs, therefore, tend to team up with extra-regional organizations rather than nearby IGOs due to reasons such as limited resources, "as witnessed particularly severely in the cases of AU in Darfur and Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo" (Hettne and Soderbaum 2006, 230).

Additionally, competition among regional organizations for organizational autonomy, institutional relevance and political influence threatens the viability of continental approaches to security and peace by duplicating efforts and fragmenting support, Franke (2007) notes, for instance, that although they have carried out operations on the ground in conflicts, e.g., the case of collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Mali and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central African Republic, and established a "Memoranda of Understanding," the collaboration efforts among the AU and sub-regional organizations are often hindered by coordination gaps and intra-

regional rivalries (Koops and Tardy 2015). If anything, though, the positive proximity coefficient further supports the findings in Table 3.2 regarding organizational type heterophily.[17]

Isolates have a pronounced effect on networks as well. As noted earlier, some IGOs are not always geared toward collaborating with others, presumably due to preserving their organizational identity and autonomy. Policy fragmentation among member states and disagreements between IGOs may hinder partnerships as well. The lack of collaboration between IGAD and the UN in Somalia is often attributed to the fragmented approach among member states as well as disagreement between IGAD and the UN with regard to the lifting of UN imposed arms embargo (Mays 2009).

Interestingly, prior bad experience variable that is operationalized as the number of casualties suffered by IGO dyads appears to positively affect whether IGOs are likely to repeat their collaboration. Although the relationship is statistically significant, it seems to have little effect on determining the likelihood of future collaborations between IGOs, as the coefficient estimate is very small. This positive coefficient is somewhat puzzling as it suggests that IGO dyads that have suffered heavy casualties, collectively, would be more likely to collaborate in the future. One possible explanation to note is that despite the consequence of the partnership, e.g., either a good or bad experience, prior collaborations would help IGOs to cultivate trustworthiness. On the one hand, even though the IGOs have become fatigued of failed operations, they would continue to partner with their prior collaborators, as it would provide them a chance to reflect on their failures. For example,

[17] This finding might also be driven by IGOs, e.g., NATO, which extended their geographic radiuses owing to the reasons sustaining their identities, and relevance as security organizations. In addition to operating in the territories of its member's states and their immediate neighbors, NATO forces, for instance, deploy in "less 'obvious' areas such as Afghanistan and the Sudan" (Haugevik 2007, 9-10).

while misery of civil war in Balkans brought two strange bedfellows together as Smith-Windsor (2011) puts it, the bad news (bad experience) that has been inflicted on them appears not to have stopped the UN and NATO to repeat or retain their collaboration in other conflict theaters around the world, Mali is a case in point.

On the other hand, given their varied capacities, lack of requisite financial and logistical capabilities, IGOs may have no choice but to cooperate even if their prior partnership was construed as a failure. For instance, although African and UN peacekeepers have suffered heavy casualties in Darfur, the collaboration between the UN and AU persist. The AU and UN have come to realize that they need each other's support if they are to conduct an effective mission. While the UN provides the necessary financial resources, and capabilities, and legitimacy that a mission requires, the presence of the AU galvanizes local and regional support for the mission.

**Goodness of Fit Diagnostics and Model Degeneracy**

In this part, I turn to goodness of fitness tests to assess whether my simulated model recovers observed networks. As Goodreau et al. (2009) note a sensible model specification for dyadic dependent processes may be problematic, and "a seemingly reasonable model may in fact have very counterintuitive implications" (Goodreau et al. 2009, 110).

ERG and TERG models often suffer from degeneracy problems. That is to say, in case that we specify a model that is unlikely to produce the observed network, either the estimations do not exist and estimations do not converge, i.e., produce no results, or the estimations do not afford a good fit to the modeled data (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011). Degeneracy problems do not necessarily mean that the theory or intuitions about the process we model is wrong though and can indeed be overcome by specifying a better-fitting model for the data (Goodreau et al. 2009; Cranmer et al. 2012b).

**Figure 3.1. Goodness of Fit Plots**




As noted above, even if the estimations converge, and produce coefficient estimates, this does not necessarily mean that the model does not completely fit the data. Thus, I ran goodness of fit diagnostics to evaluate how well my model fits the observed graph of connections between participating organizations in each case. This procedure "compares structural statistics of the observed graph with the corresponding statistics on graphs simulated from the fitted model" (Hunter et al. 2008, 2). Figure 3.1 represents goodness of fitness plots, which compare the observed data to 10000 simulated networks for a given network statistic, such as triadic closure. The first plot represents the degree distribution, tabulated across all actors in the network (Goodreau et al. 2009), i.e., IGOs. The second plot shows the distribution of shared partners, namely number of the partners in common,

tabulated across all pairs of partners. The last plot represents the distribution of geodesic distance, which is the pairwise path distance between partners. Put differently, distance between partners is “1”, and it is “2” between partners of partners who are not partners directly—indirect ties (Goodreau 2009).

In all plots, the vertical axis is the logit of relative frequency, the solid lines represent the model statistics, and the boxplots include the interquartile range and the median, and gray bands capture 95% confidence intervals (Hunter et al. 2008). As it is shown in Figure 3.1, represented by edge-wise shared partners plot, even though the model to some extent underestimates the observed number of shared partners, it overall recovers the underlying data well (as indicated by the solid line between 95% confidence interval bands). The plot then suggests that the model captures aspects of the social structure of the IGO networks conducting peace operations and social processes that induce IGOs to collaborate.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has shed light on several aspects and factors of partnership formation among IGOs in peace operations. I argued, and the data have largely shown, that along with exogenous covariates, the structure of interdependencies in general, and the effect of triadic closure in particular, may be the underlying motives for inter-organizational collaborations on the ground in peace operations. In other words, contrary to previous studies on the subject (Balas 2011b), this chapter shows that incorporating endogenous interdependence structures, such as triadic closure, is essential to the formation of IGO networks. Another important finding is that after accounting for structural interdependencies, such as friend-of-a-friend triadic closure, or the structure of a network in a previous time point, some of the previously studied and reported determinants (Balas 2011b) of IGO network formation, such as shared organizational function, drop out of statistical significance.

The next chapter will discuss the role of these IGO networks, their structural properties, such as centralizations, and composition, e.g., organizational function homophily, in affecting the peace operations' performance in implementing their core goals.

# CHAPTER 4 THEORY AND EMPIRICS IN THE STUDY OF PEACE OPERATIONS SUCCESS

## Introduction

The November 16th, 2006, High-Level Consultations in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, concluded with the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) decision to supplement the existing African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and to deploy an "unprecedented" joint and hybrid peace mission (un.org). Though the African Union (AU) and United Nations (UN) hybrid mission (UNAMID) is unprecedented in that it is the first hybrid mission [18] deployed by two intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), it is hardly unprecedented that two or more IGOs would undertake collaborative efforts in carrying out peace operations in the field. Indeed, due to a variety of peace challenges—particularly after the Cold War and the related rise of ethnic, sectarian intrastate wars—collaborative efforts between IGOs in conducting peace operations have become increasingly common (Talentino 2005; Williams 2013).

To that end, the UN, for instance, began to reform its peacekeeping doctrine and its relations with regional and sub-regional organizations. In a similar way, in order to share the burden of peace operations in a coordinated manner, the UN began to develop a process of multilateral dialogue with regional and sub-regional organizations (Felicio 2009) because of the view that success in peace operations demands calibration and coordination of efforts across a wide range of contexts between the organizations, nation states, and local authorities involved.

[18] Different from other collaborative peace operations, UNAMID was planned as a joint inter-organizational mission with one command structure. It was designed that the hybrid mission would be lead by the AU and formed by African troops while the UN would provide capacities such as funding, equipment, as well as logistics (Pelz and Lehmann 2007).

As expressed in the introductory chapter, various actors are engaged in various peace operation activities. Overlapping mandates and complex partnerships are becoming a common feature of peace operations. Yet, despite their growing importance for the future of peace missions and their outcomes, the specific topic of inter-organizational relations in peace operations remains largely uncharted. And thus, as Bellamy and Williams (2013) point out, taking these partnerships and collaborative efforts into consideration in evaluating peace operations is one of the key challenges for future research. Understanding the role of collaborative efforts among IGOs in peace operations is important for several reasons. Perhaps most critically, an understanding of peace operation outcomes is incomplete and probably flawed without an appreciation of the role of IGOs and the interactions between them.

Although scholars have underscored that collaboration among IGOs and the pooling of resources are crucial for the success of peace operations (Koops and Tardy 2015; Balas 2011a), there have been few systematic efforts to examine how and why an inter-organizational network (IGO network), which "consists of all of the organizations linked by a specific type of relation and is constructed by finding the ties between all the organizations" (Aldrich 1979, 281), might be essential to peace operation performance. My approach, therefore, is consistent with recent calls to study the role of inter-organizational collaborative efforts and partnerships in peace operations, and more specifically, the effect of their structural features and composition on peace operations' performance in achieving their core goals: violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement. In other words, this dissertation research adds theoretical literature on peace operations by empirically analyzing the possible relationship between cohesion (denoted as density), and structure (i.e.

centralization) of inter-organizational networks and their composition and the success and failure of peace operations.

Building on previous chapters discussing the collaborative efforts among IGOs and the structural properties of the networks they form, this chapter seeks to determine what effect the structure of inter-organizational networks has on peace operation performance. Thus I address this specific question: How do the composition and structure of inter-organizational networks affect the success and failure of peace operations in implementing their core goals? References to the salience of inter-organizational networks for organizational performance and outcomes, such as solving collective action problems, are not uncommon, yet there is no study, to the best of my knowledge, that focuses on the role and effect of IGO networks' composition and structure in the performance of peace operations.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the following section, I briefly review the literature on inter-organizational collaboration and the success and failure of peace operations. I conclude by introducing my hypotheses and specifying the ways I will analyze network effects on outcomes.

**The Literature on Peace Operations**

Fortna and Howard (2008) suggest that the literature on peacekeeping "has come in one small and two big waves" (Fortna and Howard 2008, 284). The first wave of studies during the Cold War mostly dealt with peacekeeping in interstate wars. The second wave of studies after the end of Cold War focused primarily on failures of peacekeeping such as the missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia, notwithstanding important cases of successes, e.g., Mozambique, and Guatemala. Even though the studies of first and second waves have concentrated on descriptions and policy prescriptions, third wave has dealt with "systematic

and methodologically rigorous analysis (both quantitatively and qualitatively) of basic empirical questions about the effects of peacekeeping and the sources of peacekeeping outcomes" (Fortna and Howard 2008, 283). Many studies in that school of thought have noted that peacekeeping is effective in maintenance of international peace and security (Haas 1986; Fortna 2004b); yet few of these studies have examined the factors that might account for effectiveness of these missions.

In the past few years, the literature on peace operations shifted its focus to any variation between failures and successes, but empirical analysis of the causes of peacekeeping outcomes has been less conclusive (Fortna and Howard 2008) and many questions such as which organizations, e.g., pairs of organizations, regional organizations, or the UN, are most effective in keeping peace and how their collaborative efforts might account for peace operations' performance still linger.

Determinants of Success/Failure in Peace Operations

Many studies have documented the effects of peace operations on conflict management and resolution. The historical record in peace operations indicates that there have been conspicuous successes and failures, which have been affected by various factors. How much of the outcome can be attributed to the peace operation itself given, for example, that peacekeepers are often sent to the most difficult conflicts (Melander 2009; Diehl 2008)? On the one hand, "it might be too much to expect those missions to make a significant difference in the behavior of implacable enemies" (Diehl 2008, 125). On the other hand, there are many factors beyond the control of the peace operations that can account for a mission's success or failure (Bellamy and Williams 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; MacQueen 2008; Diehl 2008). Diehl (2008) puts factors that might affect the success and failure of peace operations into three categories: operational, contextual and behavioral.

Operational factors are the ones under the control of peacekeepers such as how the operation is organized and executed. Contextual factors are associated with the conflict environment, which are not potentially under the control of peace operations. And, behavioral factors—reactions of key actors in the conflict—are important in determining the success or failure of peace missions as well, Diehl (2008) notes.

Operational factors focus on organizational characteristics of the mission that might lead to success or failure. Mandates of operations, resources available to peacekeepers, and coordination among the main actors and stakeholders are often cited as critical factors that determine if an operation would succeed in accomplishing its goals. Although there is no guarantee of success in UN peace operations, for Guehenno (2002), they can be better managed provided that resources match the needs of the mission and mandates (Urquhart 1987; Guehenno 2002). In line with Guehenno's argument concerning reasons for failure in peace missions, O'Shea (2002) contends that weak mandates, insufficient training of forces, inadequate resources (Malaquias 1996; Jett 2000), and mismanagement on the ground are likely to contribute to the failure of operations.

As another operational factor, for Bellamy and Williams (2005), legitimacy of a peace operation is crucial in accounting for effectiveness, and thus, success of a mission. Should an operation be perceived as illegitimate by the international society, it cannot provide international peace and security since its outcome will not be granted international validation, and because it will not garner the support of local population. Furthermore, a mission should be regarded as impartial since otherwise IGO(s) conducting the operation will be viewed as a party to the conflict, and thereby the operation will lose its legitimacy, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) is a case in point (Evans 1993). Moreover, the perceived legitimacy of an operation might erode over time; thus, it is suggested that when capable and

legitimate government structures emerge in the country where the operation was deployed, the role played by peacekeepers should diminish. Additionally, international actors should promote "national and local ownership, in order to contribute to the achievement of a sustainable peace" (UN Peacekeeping Operations 2008, 37).

In addition to operational factors that may inhibit or contribute to success, contextual factors, i.e., circumstances of the conflict, including presence of domestic institutions, such as financial institutions, (Paris 1997; Manwaring and Fishel 1998; Day and Freeman 2003), healthy economy and adequate resources (Doyle and Sambanis 2006), a long history of dispute (Fortna 2003; Fortna 2004a; Fortna 2004b), organized crime (Shaw and Kemp 2012; Kemp et al. 2013), and geographic configuration of the conflict (Diehl 1994) might affect the success and failure of a given mission. The presence of reliable domestic institutions in target country is also crucial for peace to persist. Manwaring and Fishel (1998) point out that "post-conflict military security and economic development cannot be sustained once peacekeepers depart unless there is left behind in national institutions the basic 'political competence' needed to deliver continuing security, growth, and other essential public services" (As cited in Durch and Berkman 2006, 17). As Doyle and Sambanis (2006) assert, in ethnically divided societies, provided that the elections, electoral rules, or institutions support or reward one group, this would encourage hate speech, the formation of ethnically driven political parties, which would undermine the stable peace in the long run (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). To illustrate, IFOR efforts in Bosnia have prevented the resumption of the civil war, yet "broader peacebuilding, e.g., repatriation of refugees has been stifled by elections that have handed power to ethnically polarized parties" (Diehl 2008, 140). For Fortna (2004a, 2004b, 2008), ethnic conflicts are more likely to resume after the withdrawal of peacekeepers. Additionally, if the conflict has a long history of militarized disputes, the

fighting even during the presence of peacekeepers is more likely to reignite (Fortna 2003, 2004a, 2008).

Finally, behavior of actors, "those directly involved as well as third parties" (Diehl 2008, 142), might account for the success/failure of peace operations. For instance, the number of parties to the conflict along with other factors would affect an operation's outcome. The larger the number of parties involved in conflict, the more difficult to reach a settlement, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) suggest. The lack of commitment and will by major powers to stop the violence also undermine the chance of success (Jett 2000). In a somewhat similar vein, for Downs and Stedman (2002), even though support of great powers in peace operations might not be a factor that ensures the success of a mission, its absence in intractable conflicts (hard cases) guarantees the failure of the mission. Furthermore, the presence of the external support for belligerents, for Pushkina (2006), is a crucial factor that affects the operation outcome. Supply of any type of assistance to belligerents would limit the peacekeepers ability to stop violence, thus will undermine the success (Evans 1993; Pushkina 2004; Pushkina 2006), and presumably prolong the conflict.

In addition to major powers, and third-party states, sub-national or transnational actors might account for effectiveness of an operation. To illustrate, organized crime in conflict zones has undermined the attempts of international community to tackle the problems of instability and violence, and has become a major threat to peace operations (Shaw and Kemp 2012; Kemp et al. 2013). Criminal groups or terrorist organizations may disrupt peace processes by teaming up with spoilers, armed groups, and paramilitaries as in Mali and Somalia (Kemp et al. 2013). Hence as the Brahimi Report (2000) highlighted, "the United Nations must be prepared to deal effectively with spoilers if it expects to achieve a consistent record of success in intrastate/transnational conflicts."

Above studies produced sophisticated analyses of factors affecting the performance of peace operations, particularly in achieving their core goals. Yet, inter-organizational networking among IGOs in peace operations as a factor of success/failure has not been studied, and might contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of peace operations' performance.

## Effects of IGO Networks on Peace Operations Outcomes

### Structural Properties of IGO Networks and Peace Operations Performance

Structure matters. System level analysis is one of the main principles of neorealist paradigm in international relations. The structure of the international system, i.e., anarchy, does affect the behavior of states (units), and policy outcomes, neorealists suggest (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1995). The international system restricts some actions of units, as well as influences the outcomes of unit interaction (Waltz 1979), e.g., the outcome of inter-organizational collaboration and cooperation in peace operations. In line with discussions regarding the role of structure in explaining the state and IGO behavior in international system, one of the main tenets of network analysis is the "idea that the structure of relations among actors has certain consequences, regardless of the level of analysis" (Mizruchi 2014, 200). Therefore, one should analyze not only the interactions among units but also the causal effects of structure on unit interaction (Biermann 2008).

Further, a good network theory should "propose how structures of interactions enable coordinated interaction to achieve collective and individual interests" (Salancik 1995, 348). Though there is no consensus on in what ways structural characteristics and the composition of a network may affect its performance, network centralization and density are viewed as the main factors that have a moderating effect on network effectiveness (Provan and Milward 1995; Provan and Sebastian 1998; Gulati and Singh 1998).

Inter-organizational networks in peace operations represent a form of collective action providing global peace and security, which are akin to public goods. In the international system, there is no mechanism to compel states or organizations to participate; thus peace operations are "vulnerable to 'free-riding'" (Diehl 2008, 89; Balas 2011b)—reaping the "benefits of a collective good provided by the contributors of other group members while paying none of the price" (Marwell et al. 1988, 504)—by IGOs and states. For instance, studies applying collective action theories to peacekeeping operations by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the UN (Shimizu and Sandler 2002; Dantiki 2005) document that costs of operations, such as troops expense, are shared by a handful of states while others free ride.

Collective action theorists contend "overcoming the free-rider problem requires organizing potential contributors, thus making their decisions interdependent" (Marwell et al. 1988, 502). That is to say, actors, e.g., organizations, or individuals, decide to contribute to collective action based on how much others have already contributed or would contribute (Oliver et al. 1985).

In the field, IGOs carry out tasks ranging from organizing relief agencies, and various military units to collaborating with other international organizations and local entities. Given "the absence of an inter-organizational infrastructure of authority all entities acknowledge" (Roberts and Bradley 2005, 112), at the operational level, IGOs develop personal and professional relationships with other IGOs on ad hoc basis establishing "complex webs of relations" (Roberts and Bradley 2005, 112). These complex webs of relations operate with complete organizational independence that leads to a "coordination nightmare" (Martin 2000) (As cited in Roberts and Bradley 2005), which would ultimately hamper efficiency of peace operations.

**Figure 4.1. Centralization and Density Illustrations**

High-Centrality Network



| Network Measures | |
|---|---|
| Centralization | 1 |
| Density | 0.33 |

High-Density Network



| Network Measures | |
|---|---|
| Centralization | 0.2 |
| Density | 0.8 |

Given this context, Gulati and Singh (1998) suggest that a clear leadership of a focal organization that affords the alliance with cohesion and guidance is sine qua non of a stable alliance and partnership. Central actors enable the implementation of tasks within networks (Eade 1997; Atouba and Shumate 2010) and enhance the level of cooperation (Alter 1990). That is to say, these central actors act as a coordinating body for unlinked actors, who make small contributions to the public good, yet benefit from it. Central organizations, furthermore, "translate and coordinate smaller contributions of such organizations into effective collective action in order to achieve a public good" (Atouba and Shumate 2010, 298).

The actors central to the network—as demonstrated in Figure 4.1—manage interactions and transactions within the network (Biermann 2008) and provide the forum for meeting and sharing information. Because this forum is convened around an overall implementation plan, "encompassing all the mandated tasks in a mission, and jointly agreed upon by the different stakeholders in the field" (Derblom et al. 2008, 64), it will preclude

mandate overlap and harmonize directions from different offices (Derblom et al. 2008) as well as synchronize efforts by other IGOs. In this regard, centralized networks will further encourage collaborative efforts among IGOs, and be more effective in their coordination and collaboration efforts, subsequently bringing the network as a whole to success (O'Toole 1996). Following this logic, Alagappa (1999) asserts that in peace operations, the Security Council must have the ultimate responsibility and political control, while all other responsibilities may be shared among other IGOs. Should there is an ambiguity in the control and leadership of the operation, not only the success of the operation will be hampered but also tensions between institutions will be exasperated, the chain of command will be complicated, thus coordination and accountability problems will arise (Alagappa 1999, 290). Similarly, Harsch and Varwick (2009) point out that the UN has the legitimacy, potential and authority to become the central coordinating body in peace operations, and thus, the UN's central role would "help to streamline international actions and facilitate resolving 'turf wars' between the actors involved" (Harsch and Varwick 2009, 35).

Studies on collective action dilemmas suggest that not only the network centralization, but also density of the network, which denotes the extensiveness of ties between network members (Aldrich and Whetten 1981), is associated with the effectiveness of collective action. Though prior studies on network effectiveness note that network density facilitates collective action (Tilly 1978), contrary to the conventional wisdom, the empirical research on the relationship between density and collective action has found mixed outcomes.

Marwell et al. (1988), for instance, have noted that density of the network extends the reach of an organizer, and thus helps to promote greater contribution by network actors. In a similar vein, echoing Axelrod's discussion that cooperation cannot occur if it is "tried only by

scattered individuals who have no chance to interact with each other" (Axelrod 1984, 68), Kim and Bearman (1997) note that dense ties among members of the network enhance commitment, which in turn promote successful collective action. More precisely, their findings reveal that if network density is close to zero (a sparse network, which mostly is comprised of isolates), actors contribute to collective good solely based on their individual considerations, and granted the absence of social ties; collective action would not be successful (Kim 1995). On the contrary, should network density "approaches saturation (i.e., density above .5), the 'local' boundary of rationality' becomes globalized and no transaction cost accrues to interpersonal interactions, including information exchange" (Kim and Bearman 1997, 88). By the same token, in dense networks, "contributions result from greatly enhanced 'group efficacy,' and successful collective action is the norm, not the exception" (Kim and Bearman 1997, 88). In a nutshell, increasing interaction among network actors is decisive in accounting for the success of collective action (Kim and Bearman 1997) since actors in densely knit networks, as shown in 4.1, high- density illustration, are better able to address and solve credibility and coordination problems that arise from collaborative projects, e.g., peace missions.

In conjunction with these theories, Mizruchi (2014) notes that in order for organizations to engage in collective action and achieve a certain degree of success in accomplishing their collective goals, unity and a certain level of cohesion among network members is required (Also see Worchel et al. 1991). Some empirical support for this hypothesis is provided by McCubbins et al. (2009), who found that increase in the connectivity of the networks they studied led to greater coordination and faster solutions in resolving collective action problems. Therefore, it appears that "a cohesive group will exhibit successful task performance" (Mullen and Copper 1994, 210) as opposed to a loosely

connected network. Applying this logic to inter-organizational coordination during peace operations, scholars suggest that the level of cohesion during Liberian peace operations has helped IGOs to carry out a wide range of tasks and operations from peacekeeping to peace enforcement (Olonisakin 2000) and contribute to their success in abating violence and settling the conflict, which would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement without collaborative efforts.

Additionally, the smooth operation of a system, e.g., an IGO network, has long been recognized as being achieved by improving coordination among network actors through a greater degree of cohesiveness (Anderson 1978). Likewise social capital perspective (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995) suggests that actors in dense networks with overlapping links are more likely to collaborate, and thereby enhance coordination in the resolution of collection action problems. It is because groups, organizations or individuals operate in densely knit networks are better able to solve credibility problems, which arise from collaborative projects (Scholz et al. 2008), e.g., peace operations.

These collaborative networks are often dynamic, and hence, over time, these dense clustered networks might cultivate shared interests, beliefs, norms and values capable of fostering a wide range of activity and expand the tie formation among other network actors (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993).

Density also enhances legitimacy (Provan and Kenis, 2007). Thus, forming dense networks may be particularly critical in implementing conflict settlement and conflict containment of peace operations as belligerents often view the deployment of UN peacekeepers obstructing their political ambitions (Adebajo 2011). In this sense, participation of regional and sub-regional IGOs along with the UN forces may facilitate negotiating a peace agreement since it would be seen as more inclusive and fair. For instance, organizing

several conferences and bridging together representatives from conflict parties, regional leaders from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) contributed to peacemaking and conflict settlement efforts in Sudan (Adebajo 2001). Similarly, African states valued the involvement of the AU as a multilateral expression "of a general 'African' will over the case of Darfur" (Gelot 2012, 71).

Similar to centralized networks, dense relations will lessen transaction and enforcement costs attributed to credibility problems that arise from collective action dilemmas since actors part of a dense network will be more willing to engage in collaboration. Further, echoing Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's (1993) study, Scholz et al. (2008) point out that beliefs and attitudes in dense networks are expected to converge over time, which will presumably facilitate future collaboration.

Yet, in contrast to above cited studies, Macy (1991a) reported that a dense network hampers collective action since in dense networks actors cannot differentiate between cooperators and defectors (Macy 1991a), and thus, density is not a condition for effective cooperation. In fact, if collaborative efforts are to be effective, forming loosely connected, sparse networks, with diverse set of actors, should be preferred over high-density networks (Mullen and Copper 1994).

These arguments can be restated as the following empirical implications:

Hypothesis 1a: Centralized IGO networks are more likely to be successful (than decentralized IGO networks) in abating violence.

Hypothesis 1b: Centralized IGO networks are more likely to be successful (than decentralized IGO networks) in containing conflict.

Hypothesis 1c: Centralized IGO networks are more likely to be successful (than decentralized IGO networks) in conflict settlement.

Hypothesis 2a: The higher IGO network's density, the more likely peace operations will be successful in violence abatement.

Hypothesis 2b: The higher IGO network's density, the more likely peace operations will be successful in conflict containment.

Hypothesis 2c: The higher IGO network's density, the more likely peace operations will be successful in conflict settlement.

**Composition of IGO Networks and Peace Operations Performance**

Diminishing the risks of collaborative failures or maximizing the success of collaborative efforts, as expressed earlier, has become an increasingly important goal for IGOs. This has been particularly important due to increasing salience of partnerships for organizational survival and global problem solving (Atouba and Shumate 2015). Studies on inter-organizational collaborations note that not only the structural characteristics of a given network, i.e., its centralization and density, but also its composition, whether characterized by organizations sharing the same organizational characteristics, is critical for effectiveness of collective action solutions (McPherson et al. 2001).

Theories of homophily (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; Ibarra 1992: McPherson et al. 2001), for instance, note that actors are more likely to form ties with the ones with whom they are likely to identify themselves. Scholars contend that dense connections form among the actors that share a common purpose, values, cultures and shared interests (Gibbons 2007). But how would homophily and organizational attributes account for effectiveness of IGO networks?

It is unlikely that the question posed has a straightforward answer. For instance, in contrast to Olson (1965), who suggests that group heterogeneity, e.g., type of actors, the degree of resources available to them, and their organizational function, is favorable to

collective action, Macy (1991b) notes that heterogeneity is not a necessary condition for generating collective action, yet it may explain why actors opt out, or are reluctant to contribute to collaborations since they may not get along with the ones that are not similar to them. In a similar vein, others argue that collective action problems, such as peace operations, in which the partners commit unequally have a higher failure rate, since the organization that "commits at a lower level will deliver insufficient effort and resources to the partnership" (Shumate et al. 2005, 490). Peace operations suffer from unequal burden-sharing (Mancini 2011) due to the lack of commitment and engagement by actors (Morris 2010), which are driven by the lack of bureaucratic, logistical and financial capabilities of collaboration partners. Similarly, "varying degrees of commitment to UN missions reduce the clarity of tasks and aims of peace operation mandates," Junk (2012, 250) suggests. Regardless of the reasons of unequal commitment and partnerships, inequities would curb the success of missions (Boutellis and Williams 2013).

IGOs must have the required resources and capabilities to achieve peace operations' objectives, such as reducing violence, containing and settling conflict in which the countries they are deployed. Though the UN has been the predominant peacekeeper in many conflicts and maintains the majority of peacekeepers in operations, regional and sub-regional organizations have increased the tempo of their missions. The AU, for instance, has hugely increased its engagement in African conflicts to operationalize its new principle of "non-indifference" (Williams 2013, 2). Yet, as often noted, these organizations notably the African IGOs do not have capabilities and resources to undertake these missions on their own. IGOs with high capacity, e.g., the European Union (EU), therefore launch capacity building initiatives in Africa to strengthen basic institutional capacities and efficiency of the AU and

other regional and sub-regional organizations in the conduct and planning of peace operations.

As an example, with regard to the EU-AU-UN collaboration, there are structural imbalances due to the fact that these organizations are unequal entities in term of their organizational capacities, which might curb the coordination among them, and thereby effectiveness of their missions. As compared to the UN and the EU, the AU is a young organization with limited capabilities and scarce resources. In this regard, in dyads of the UN and AU, and the EU and AU, there seems to be an "imbalance for finding equal counterparts for dialogue" (Derblom et al. 2008, 65), thus the coordination between the UN-EU is expected to be more effective as compared to the other possible dyads constructed from these organizations (Derblom et al. 2008). Similarly, the AU's lack of institutional capacity hampers inter-organizational cooperation with the EU. Being understaffed and having scarce resources, the AU could not handle the workload and accordingly "the organization's absorption capacity for international support measures has declined" (Franke 2009, 70).

In addition to resource imbalance, the network literature emphasizes the role of organizational function, culture and values in accounting for formation and maintenance of collaborative relations, and generating effective collective action accordingly. There is no agreement in the literature on how organizational function homophily might influence the performance of IGO networks, nonetheless. On the one hand, some suggest that differences in organizational functions and culture might account for coordination problems and limit harmonization and efficiency of operations. In this perspective, analysts note that networks operate effectively when actors voluntarily behave as if they are all part of a broader organization sharing common values and cultures. This sense of community may be easier to instill in an intra-organizational network, where assets are held by a single actor, than in a

dynamic inter-organizational network, where assets are spread across changeable combinations of actors. However, in either case, the network must create an organization "culture" that transcends ownership and national borders (Snow et al. 1992) to perform effectively. To that end, it is advised that shared roles and identities are established among network actors so that they can orient themselves toward one another, and mobilize collective action quickly and effectively (Friedrich 2014). To illustrate, it is often noted that being a military actor, NATO has been reluctant to coordinate with non-military actors, e.g., the UN. It is mostly because first, NATO is less aware of civilian dimensions of conflict and crises management. And second, the organization does not want to be coordinated by other organizations, such as the EU (Major and Molling 2009).

On the other hand, others, such as Provan and Kenis (2007) point out that instrumental reasons, e.g. goal similarity between network partners, rather than organizational similarity or attractiveness, have more important implications for the formation inter-organizational networks and their performance. Collaboration requires a certain degree of consensus regarding the goals that organizations set in order them to engage in collective action (Provan and Kenis 2007). On the contrary, Park (1996) notes that similarity of goals might lead to competitiveness among network partners resulting in difficulties, including lack of cooperation and information exchange, thus hampers effective coordination and collaboration.

Coordination problems, which derive from the status incongruity, indeed can be overcome by collaboration and cooperation among IGOs. Learning through collaboration and exchange of information in inter-organizational networks creates the process of organizations becoming similar in design and functioning: "institutional isomorphism" and "epistemic isomorphism" which is the tendency of organizational convergence owing to the

norms or experiences shared by organizations' staff and leaders, and shared epistemic values (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

In inter-organizational collaboration context, it can be assumed that the more organizations learn from each other, and the more similar they become in their conduct of operations; cooperation and coordination will be easier (Lorange and Ross 1992; Koops 2008). For instance, after the Cold War the Euro-Atlantic security institutions have been transforming into a risk oriented security management institutions, similar to NATO (Wallender and Keohane 1999). While "NATO had Cold War assets it could simply rededicate towards 'peace support operations,' the EU had to create a plethora of new bodies which bear a remarkable similarity to the corresponding NATO bodies" (Biermann 2008, 172) to facilitate the cooperation and coordination between these two organizations. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) of the EU, for example, resembles the NATO Council, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) is similar to NATO's Military Committee (Biermann 2008). Organizational similarity, as noted earlier, is likely to translate into better coordination, and cohesion, which would engender effectiveness in implementing peace operations' core goals.

In light of these theories, I articulate the importance of network composition in affecting the performance of peace operations, and hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 3a: Collaborations among IGOs having same level of resource capacity are more likely to be successful in violence abatement.[19]

Hypothesis 3b: Collaborations among IGOs having same level of resource capacity are more likely to be successful in conflict containment.

[19] Regardless of the level of resource capacity, it is expected that IGO networks with the same level of resource capacity would be more successful.

Hypothesis 3c: Collaborations among IGOs having same level of resource capacity are more likely to be successful in conflict settlement.

Hypothesis 4a: Collaborations among IGOs sharing same organizational function are more likely to be successful in abating violence.

Hypothesis 4b: Collaborations among IGOs sharing same organizational function are more likely to be successful in containing conflict.

Hypothesis 4c: Collaborations among IGOs sharing same organizational function are more likely to be successful in settling conflict.

Conflict and Conflict Country Characteristics

The broad consensus in the conflict management and resolution literature is that the outcome of peace processes and operations will be determined by the characteristics of host country and the conflict itself (Heldt 2001, Diehl and Druckman 2009; Koko and Essis 2012). Diehl and Druckman (2009) note that context of peace operations vary depending on the country and conflict in which they are deployed. I will address and control for the variables that are mostly studied in the research literature.

As expressed earlier, the target country in which peace missions are launched and conflict characteristics can play an important role in accounting for peace operation outcomes. The next set of hypotheses I lay out therefore focus on those conflict and country characteristics. Among the factors that may affect peace operations outcomes, scholars highlight the factors associated with the conflict characteristics, such as conflict intensity and conflict issues, and conflict country attributes, e.g., country size, local capacities, and ethnic fractionalization of the country in which peace missions are carried out.

Though literature on conflict management and peace operations suggests that conflict intensity is one of the determinants of conflict peace operations success, there is little

agreement over whether the conflict intensity is positively or negatively related with peace operations performance. Although some scholars suggest that conflict intensity is negatively correlated with the conflict management success, particularly with regard to conflict settlement, as it makes bargaining more difficult due to polarization between the conflict parties (Kleiboer 1996; Jackson 2000; Koko and Essis 2012), "by evaluating conflict intensity in terms of fatalities experienced by each adversary" (Bercovitch et al. 1991, 13), others find that conflict management success is positively correlated with intensity of a conflict (Bercovitch et al. 1991). In line with Jackson (2000), Diehl and Druckman (2009) point out that parties to the conflict are less inclined to grant concessions and reconcile with their enemies if the conflicts are more serious, i.e., high intensity. The chances of peace operation success, particularly with regard to conflict settlement, should diminish with increasing casualties since this would generate resentment and harden feelings of enmity between conflict actors.

Conflict management literature also finds a strong relationship between the issues for which conflicts are waged and peace operations' outcome. Conflict issues are often categorized as the ones related to tangible issues which refers to control over territory, and intangible issues, such as disagreements between conflict parties over ideological issues, including government type (Jackson 2000). Scholarly view on the subject holds that disagreements over territorial issues and threats to territorial integrity are an important condition for the onset of armed conflict (Heldt 2001). Furthermore, territorial issues "have perceived value based on long-standing religious, historical, or ethnic connections (*e.g.*, Jerusalem or Kosovo)" (Diehl and Druckman 2009, 13), and thus, they often have an emotional appeal to a certain group. As compared to conflicts over ideological disagreements, conflicts over territorial issues, therefore, are hard to negotiate and

compromise with a narrow “bargaining space” (Diehl and Druckman 2009). Additionally, Stedman et al. (2002) suggest that even if conflict over territorial disagreements result in peace agreements, they have limited prospects for lasting peace.

In addition to conflict characteristics’ impact on peace operation outcome, part of the conflict context that determines peace operation’s success is the characteristics of the conflict country in which peace operations are deployed. For instance, a peace operation’s success, particularly with regard to violence abatement and conflict containment, might be jeopardized by the size of territory that peacekeepers have to control. In most of conflict environments, there are several groups operating in different parts of the county and provided that peacekeepers have to cover a broad and large territory, they are likely to become targets of spoilers that would “open up the possibility of more violent incidents” (Diehl and Druckman 2009, 10) mitigating the odds of success. Reducing the geographic scope of the conflict will shrink the areas that are needed to be monitored during a ceasefire as well; therefore, “peacekeepers will be better able to detect violations and assign responsibility for violent actions, which will have deterrent effect on potential spoilers” (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 192).

The possible role of ethnic fractionalization on conflict has received considerable attention in the conflict management literature as well. Though empirical studies on the subject found no relationship between ethnic fractionalization and onset of civil wars, this result is often attributed to the classification of ethnic groups in the Atlas Nadarov Mira (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005), the widely used ethnic fractionalization dataset. In his seminal work, Horowitz (1985) notes that there is a nonmonotic relationship between conflict and ethnic fractionalization. Countries that are ethnically homogeneous or heterogenous are less prone to armed conflicts as compared to the ones that an ethnic minority faces an ethnic

majority, Horowitz (1985) suggests. Thus, as it would be more difficult to recruit members and sustain the unity of rebel forces and organizational cohesion in multiethnic societies (Collier 2001; Heldt 2002), peace operations deployed in ethnically polarized societies would be less likely to contain grievances that stem from ethnic tensions.

The success of peace operations, particularly peacebuilding missions to a large extent, depends on the extent of local capacities in the host state (Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Diehl and Druckman 2009). I use GDP per capita as a proxy for indicating local capacity. The more local capacity with regard to per capita GDP is available, "the shorter the distance to goal achievement and the easier to the road to travel to reach that goal" Diehl and Druckman (2009, 19) note.

**Conclusion**

This chapter provided a theoretical framework to assess and explore the factors that may account for peace operation successes and failures and laid out a series of hypotheses on how IGO networks, their structural characteristics, e.g., centralization, and composition, such as organizational function homophily, might influence success in peace operations. Additionally, I discussed the role of conflict and host country characteristics in affecting the success of peace operations. The following chapter will present my research design, and introduce dependent and independent variables. And it will investigate two prominent features of IGO networks, i.e., centralization and density, and discuss my findings regarding how IGO networks, their structure and composition are associated with peace operations' performance in implementing their core goals.

# CHAPTER 5 COLLABORATING FOR PEACE? IGO NETWORKS and PEACE OPERATION PERFORMANCE

## Introduction

This chapter examines the effect of inter-organizational networks' structural properties, more specifically density and centralization, and composition, on the success and failure of peace operations. In order to explore the questions raised and hypotheses laid out in previous chapter, quantitative approaches are utilized and they are supplemented with qualitative examples. My discussion below outlines a broader set of conditions and is meant to apply to a variety of conflict scenarios into which a peace operation might be deployed.

## Research Design

### Data and Measures

I use measures drawn from social network analysis to test the possible relationship between IGO networks engaged in peace operations and outcomes of these missions. The hypotheses I laid out in previous chapter (Chapter 4) are tested on a new dataset with a temporal domain of 1990-2013, and a global spatial domain. The unit of analysis is the conflict-network-year. I examine inter-organizational IGO networks engaged in peace operations in each internal armed conflict[20] between 1990-2013. The number of observations is 174. Due to time-series cross-sectional nature of my data with binary dependent variables, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate. Following Beck et al. (1998), I account for temporal dependence in the binary outcome time-series cross-sectional data with natural cubic splines. That is, I run logistic regression with cubic splines. Along with my dependent variables—success variables—some of my variables, including the network

[20] I use the definition of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program/the Peace Research Institute Uppsala (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset's definition of armed conflict, which is the use of force between two parties, and results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. Internal armed conflicts are the ones that occur between the government of a state and one or more organized armed groups (UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset 2014).

variables and control variables, such as local capacity, vary from year to year, and thus, the model suggested by Beck et al. (1998) is more appropriate.

The model is run with robust standard errors clustered on conflict/host country. These robust standard errors are calculated conceding that observations between host countries are independent, yet observations within the host country (such as within the Democratic Republic of Congo) are not necessarily independent of each other (Fortna 2004b).

Dependent Variables

Peace operations have undergone various changes, and undertaken multiple tasks, ranging from conflict prevention to peacebuilding, with the proliferation of intra-state armed conflicts after the Cold War (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Thus it would be incorrect, as Diehl and Druckman (2010) note, to treat all the operations the same by measuring their success using the same criteria. As Whalan (2013) notes, the aggregate evaluation of peace operation performance has little value. Though each peace mission is mandated with different tasks, there are "certain general functions common to all operations, and, therefore, one can construct some standards for success that cut across all operations" (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 29).

Most notably, peace operations are assigned common core goals that are shared by all stakeholders. Even though these goals are "associated most often with traditional peacekeeping operations, virtually all peace operations seek to achieve violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement" (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 29). Employing the *Diehl and Druckman Evaluation Criteria*, I assess the effectiveness and success of peace operations in implementing their core goals.[21]

*Violence Abatement*

[21] IGO networks may take more than one year for success, and I am able to account for that through repeated year observations.

Peacekeepers are often charged with abating violence in the countries in which they are deployed. Since peace operations are almost always deployed in countries ravaged by violence, the most fundamental goal of these operations becomes the elimination or reduction of violence (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Based on this criterion proposed by Diehl and Druckman, should peacekeepers reduce or eliminate violence in the host country after their deployment, the mission would qualify as a success. Thus, the first question that should be addressed in coding violence abatement success is whether violence levels decreased since deployment of peacekeepers (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Clear indicators of violence abatement are shooting incidents and dispute-related civilian casualties, as suggested by Diehl and Druckman (2013). I surveyed news reports, IGO reports and briefings, and UCDP/PRIO One-Sided Violence Dataset v 1.4-2014, 1989-2013, to code the violent abatement variable. It is coded "1" if the peace operations deployed were able to collectively reduce the violence[22] in a year after they were deployed, as was the case in Bosnia after 1996, and "0" otherwise.[23]

*Conflict Containment*

Proliferation of internal armed conflicts following the end of Cold War constituted the greatest challenge for the international community as well as IGOs. These wars, apart from causing humanitarian tragedies, have constantly threatened to escalate beyond their point of origin to additional areas within countries' borders and to neighboring states, and to destabilize entire regions (Solana 1999). Therefore, reducing the number of belligerents and eliminating the diffusion of the conflict become among the core tasks shared by most peace

[22] The violence level before the deployment of peacekeepers is accepted as the baseline. In that sense, if peacekeeping IGOs reduce the violence after their deployment (not necessarily to zero), it is considered as a success.
[23] The variable only focuses on the violence levels in the host country, not in neighboring states.

operations (Diehl and Druckman 2013). Containing conflict helps to reduce its intensity and hence contributes to its abatement.

I judge the success of conflict containment by studying actor-based and geographic containment. First, I assess conflict containment performance by examining the geographic scope: that is, whether the conflict or violence has spread to new areas during the year in question. As suggested by Diehl and Druckman (2010), I start with the original deployment as a baseline. Though no peace operation would be able to cover an entire country, particularly if deployed in countries with huge land mass such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, peacekeepers may be able to stop arms transfer or troop movement "that enhances the opportunity for violence across the country" (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 37). Second, I measure the success of conflict along the actor dimension. Although it may be problematic to assign the acts of violence or conflict to certain actors, as Diehl and Druckman (2010) note, a simple count of parties to the conflict, and interveners, may be used to assess the success of conflict containment with regard to its actor dimension. Specifically, reduction in the number of actors or preventing new actors from entering into the conflict may be viewed as an indicator of success in containing conflict (Diehl and Druckman 2013).

Provided that conflict did not spread to new areas or that the involvement of new actors was prevented, it is coded "1", denoting success in containing conflict. It is coded "0" if peace operations did not accomplish any of the tasks listed above. IGO reports, briefings, and the UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset (GED) (Sundberg and Melander 2013) are utilized to code the conflict containment success variable.

*Conflict Settlement*

Conflict settlement refers to the resolution of disputes between belligerents. For Diehl and Druckman, "settling the conflict such that the probability of future violence is low might perhaps be the greatest achievement for a peace operation" (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 42).

The key question for evaluating conflict settlement success is whether the parties to the conflict have resolved their major disagreements after the deployment of peacekeepers (Diehl and Druckman 2013). Peacekeepers may or may not undertake tasks such as negotiating with parties to the conflict or resolving contentious issues between belligerents. In any case peace operations are expected to create the environment that would facilitate peace negotiations and thereby the settlement of the conflict (Diehl and Druckman 2010).

Thus, the commencement of negotiations or mediation between the conflict parties, or the signing of peace agreements among disputants, can be viewed as indicators of success in conflict settlement. The coding decision for this variable is based on progress reports and press briefings by IGOs as suggested by Diehl and Druckman (2010). Embracing a more minimalist approach than pursued by Diehl and Druckman (2010), I code peace operations as a success, "1," the peace agreement is signed, or negotiations are started after the deployment of peacekeepers, as was the case in Côte d'Ivoire, and "0" otherwise.[24]

Independent Variables

*Inter-Organizational Network Structure*

This dissertation studies collaborative relations among IGOs in peace operations from a social network perspective. Specifically, I examine whether the structural properties of IGO networks, particularly network centralization and density[25], might be linked to the

[24] In a sense I am incorporating partial success with success.

[25] I examine the whole network, rather than the relations between IGO dyads.

performance of peace operations in violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement.

In network parlance, centralization refers to the "particular properties of graph structure as a whole" (Scott 2000, 85) and the overall integration of a network. Centralization, therefore, describes the extent to which network cohesion is organized around particular focal points, i.e. central organizations (Scott 2000; Wasserman and Faust 1995). The centralization measure is calculated as the "ratio of the actual sum of differences to the maximum possible sum of differences" (Scott 2000, 93) and varies between "0" and 1, where "0" denotes an extremely decentralized network, and "1" denotes an extremely centralized network.

The density of a network, on the other hand, represents the extensiveness of ties between network actors or nodes. More specifically, density denotes the extent to which ties are redundant within a network, suggesting that members are connected both directly and indirectly through other members (Scott 2000). Density measures range between "0" and "1", which indicate loosely and richly joined networks, respectively (Aldrich and Whetten 1981). The concept of loosely joined network, Aldrich and Whetten (1981) note, can be understood by considering the number of missing links, i.e. non-collaborative IGOs, or the number of holes. To illustrate, if out of a potential 90 links between 18 organizations, only 23 are present, a density score of 0.26 results.

I calculated yearly network-level centralization and density measures for each IGO network deployed in an internal armed conflict using the sna package in R.

*Organizational Resource Capacity Homophily*

For organizational capacity coding, I rely on Pearson et al.'s (2013) operationalization of IGOs, with some modifications, as organizations with large capacity (n=3), such as NATO;

mid-level capacity (n=6), such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); and limited capacity (n=11), such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The capacity is determined by human and financial resources at the organization's disposal. The data is derived from websites and reports of IGOs.

The variable is calculated as the proportion of the links between IGOs with equal organizational resource capacities to the sum of all IGO collaborative links in each IGO network in each year. In that sense, this variable is applicable to an IGO network.

*Organizational Function Homophily*

Based on the activities they undertake during peace operations, IGOs are coded as civilian (n=13), such as the EU; military (n=2), such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO); and mixed (n=5), such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The variable is calculated as the proportion of the links between IGO dyads with the same organizational function to the sum of IGO collaborative links in each IGO network. The variable captures the match of organizational security culture in regard to the whole IGO networks, rather than IGO dyads.

Control Variables

*Conflict Intensity*

It is a binary variable that takes into account the violence level of the conflict, i.e., whether it has exceeded 1,000 battle-related deaths since the onset of the conflict, and "0" otherwise. The data source is the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2015, 1946-2014 (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).

*Conflict Issue*

A dichotomous measure of conflict issue is utilized denoting "1" if the conflict is waged due to disagreements over territorial issues, and "0" if it is related to ideological disagreements,

such as regime type. It comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, which codes conflict issues in terms of incompatibility concerning territory and incompatibility concerning government, e.g., type of political system.

Size

The country size (in square miles) denotes the sum of all land and water areas of the conflict country delimited by international coastlines and/or boundaries. The variable is logged, and drawn from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/).

*Ethnic Fractionalization (Polarization)*

For the ethnic fractionalization variable, I relied on Fearon's (2003) ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (ELF). The index measures the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the population would belong to two different ethnic groups. I constructed a dummy variable that is "1" if fractionalization score is between one standard deviation above and below the mean, and 0 otherwise.

*Local Capacity*

To capture the conflict country's local capacity, I use logged GDP per capita (in USD) as a proxy for host country's capacity. The data source is the World Bank.

**Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics**

| Variable | Mean | Standard Deviation | Minimum | Maximum | Observations |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Violence Abatement | 0.534 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 | 174 |
| Conflict Containment | 0.374 | 0.485 | 0 | 1 | 174 |
| Conflict Settlement | 0.471 | 0.500 | 0 | 1 | 174 |
| Centralization | 0.310 | 0.380 | 0 | 1 | 174 |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Density | 0.822 | 0.217 | 0.33 | 1 | 174 |
| Function | 0.353 | 0.368 | 0 | 1 | 174 |
| Resource Capacity | 0.416 | 0.354 | 0 | 1 | 174 |
| Conflict Intensity | 0.586 | 0.494 | 0 | 1 | 174 |
| Conflict Issue | 0.445 | 0.499 | 0 | 1 | 174 |
| Country Size (Log) | 20.421 | 2.185 | 13.808 | 22.926 | 174 |
| Ethnic Polarization | 0.534 | 0.256 | 0.095 | 0.933 | 174 |
| GDP per capita (Log) | 6.715 | 1.163 | 4.171 | 9.390 | 167 |

**Results**

Table 5.2 presents the estimates of my models. My models seem to indicate that the effect of IGO networks' centralization on peace operation performance is indistinguishable from zero. While the estimated coefficients for the network centralization variable remain positive, as I hypothesized, I cannot claim that centralization has an effect in accounting for a peace operation's success. This result may imply that factors that are highly correlated to peace operation performance are conditioning the success or failure of peace missions.

While I find consistent evidence that the density of networks increases the likelihood of peace operation success in the areas of violence abatement and conflict settlement, it fails to reach statistical significance in the conflict containment model [see Table 5.2]. As I expected, the density of IGO networks is positively related to conflict settlement and the coefficient is statistically significant. This finding underlines that, although integrating different

IGO forces into a cohesive inter-organizational force poses a challenge in terms of the interoperability of the mission at the operational level, the involvement of all viable actors, such as regional and sub-regional organizations, in peace processes helps to settle conflicts, presumably because it legitimates the peace settlement and its terms; the involvement of local actors may also may enhance the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of the local populations, which is often cited as a key factor in operation success. Legitimacy is critical for peace operations success as "it can increase buy-in and effectiveness; the objectives of the mission are endorsed and more states want to contribute financially and militarily" (Gelot 2012, 10).

**Table 5.2. Logistic Regression Analyses of the Effect of Inter-Organizational Networking on Peace Operations' Core Goals, 1990-2013.**

| | Violence Abatement | Conflict Containment | Conflict Settlement |
|---|---|---|---|
| *IGO Network Characteristics* | | | |
| Centralization | 0.666(1.470) | 1.585(2.364) | 1.563(1.181) |
| Density | 6.790(3.597)* | 2.764(3.456) | 3.474(2.083)* |
| Resource Capacity | -2.768(1.510)* | -5.998(2.037)** | -1.279(1.063) |
| Organizational Function | 5.756(2.321)** | -2.295(1.519) | .165(1.325) |
| *Conflict Characteristics* | | | |
| Conflict Intensity | 4.324(2.090)** | 0.026(1.215) | -0.401(1.261) |
| Conflict Issue | 1.974(1.023)* | -0.341(0.954) | -2.352(0.897)** |
| *Host Country Characteristics* | | | |
| Country Size (log) | -0.874(0.408)** | -0.424(0.253)* | -0.113(0.224) |
| Ethnic Polarization | -3.330(1.827)* | 0.832(0.939) | 2.125(0.762)** |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| GDP per capita (log)(t-1) | 0.927(0.484)* | 0.613(0.434) | 0.217(0.445) |
| Constant | -1070.346(562.135)* | -352.539(703.892) | -473.865(773.155) |
| Pseudo-R2 | 0.532 | 0.440 | 0.305 |
| N | 144 | 144 | 144 |

(Notes. Robust standard errors shown in parentheses clustered by conflict country. Dependent variables are violence abatement success, conflict containment success, and conflict settlement success. Cubic splines are not shown. Statistical significance: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.. N=144[26]).

Contrary to my expectations, the resource capacity measure is negative and statistically significant in violence abatement and conflict containment models. Two candidate explanations for this negative relationship might be resource dependency and resource scarcity. Many regional formations, particularly those in Africa, are still embryonic and need support from global arrangements if they are to implement the goals of peace missions. Thus these IGO networks, and consequently the missions they deploy, would be better off if IGOs with high or medium capacity were to match the needs of regional or sub-regional organizations lacking these resources (limited capacity IGOs).

Again as hypothesized peace operations deployed by organizations sharing the same organizational function also appear quite likely to result in positive outcomes regarding violence abatement (though not necessarily in conflict settlement). As noted earlier, this finding may indicate that organizational function homophily facilitates the construction of trust, and thus translates into better coordination and cohesion among IGOs collaborating to abate violence. This positive relationship does not hold for the conflict containment model.

[26] Missing observations are an inherent problem in any time-series cross-section dataset and my study is not free of this issue. My local capacity variable, which is measured by GDP per capita, contains missing variables, which drives down the total number of observations.

Nor is the relationship between organizational function homophily and conflict settlement statistically significant.

The evidence is mixed on whether conflict and conflict country characteristics might affect the outcome of the core goals of peace operations. I find no evidence of a relationship between conflict intensity and performance in achieving conflict containment and settlement. Surprisingly, the conflict intensity coefficient is positive in affecting violence abatement success, suggesting that peace operations deployed in high-intensity conflicts will be more likely to be successful in abating conflict. In line with this finding, Sousa (2015) points out that military intervention, as a form of peace operation does not have an impact on the escalation or de-escalation of low-intensity conflicts. A reasonable explanation may be that high-intensity conflicts receive more resources and attention, presumably increasing the chance of peace operation success. Also, Luttwak (1999) notes that war and violence indeed bring peace after the culminating phase of violence has been passed.

Prior studies noted that peace operations deployed in conflicts over territory, as opposed to disagreements over regime type or governance, would be less likely to succeed in abating violence. Contrary to my expectation, the direction of the coefficient is positive, and statistically significant with a two-tailed p-value of 0.001, indicating that peace operations deployed in conflicts over tangible issues, e.g., disagreements over territorial issues, are more likely to be successful in reducing violence.

As expected, the coefficient for conflict issue has a negative sign in conflict containment and settlement models, though the relationship between territorial claims and conflict containment fails to achieve statistical significance. As can be seen from the negative coefficient (which is also significant), peace operations tend to have a difficult time settling conflicts over territorial disagreements. That is, the success of peace operations in conflict

settlement will decrease substantially should the conflict break out over territorial disagreements, which are often secessionist in nature. One candidate explanation is that parties to the conflict would be less likely to give concessions or give up their claims over a territory to which they may have an emotional attachment and with which they may identify, as was the case in the Yugoslav Wars.

The last set of variables examines or controls for the relationship between the success of peace operations in achieving their core goals and the host country characteristics. In line with previous research, across all specifications, the effect of host country size on peace operation success is negative, and statistically significant (with the exception of conflict settlement). This finding underlines the assertion that the size of the host country does matter for the success of peace operations, particularly with regard to violence abatement and conflict containment. As Diehl and Druckman noted, "even with an extremely large peace force, securing large areas may be impractical" (Diehl and Druckman 2009, 17). For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo is 875525 square miles and shares a border with nine other states in addition to the ocean (Diehl and Druckman 2009), which makes containing conflict (geographically) extremely difficult.

I posit that peace operations would tend to have less success achieving their core goals in ethnically polarized countries. Similar to extant research that establishes a strong relationship between ethnic fractionalization and conflict onset, my findings suggest that once violence breaks out, it may be more likely to spiral out of control in countries polarized along ethnic lines, as it is likely to incite further fractionalization, whether ideological, religious, or sectarian. Violence will harden the feeling of enmity and hostility among conflict parties, even leading to retaliatory attacks. Contrary to previous studies on the subject, however, I found a positive (and significant) relationship between ethnic fractionalization

(polarization) and conflict settlement, suggesting that peace missions would be more likely to settle conflicts in ethnically polarized countries. This finding corroborates Heldt (2001), who found a positive and statistically significant relationship between ethnic polarization and peace operation success. This result demonstrates that ethnic fractionalization is a significant factor in the reasons that peace operations are successful in conflict settlement in some countries but not in others.

For Heldt (2001), ethnic fractionalization (polarization) implies that there are fewer groups in the host country that peacekeepers have to negotiate between, which facilitates settlements. These findings should be treated with caution, though, as a different operationalization of the ethnic polarization variable (along ethnic, linguistic or religious lines) may yield different results.

Lastly, the relationship between GDP per capita, as a proxy for local capacity in the host country, and the performance of peace operations' core goals is positive. However, it only reaches statistical significance in the violence abatement model. This result may be explained by two factors. First, once violence breaks out in a country with local capacities—high GDP per capita—the population will be more willing to break the cycle of violence (as they have a lot to lose). Second, along with peacekeepers' help, the country may be able to direct its resources to reverse the violent trend.

**Illustrative Cases**

This part of the chapter focuses on inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs engaged in peace missions in three internal armed conflicts: Côte d'Ivoire, Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia), Sudan:Darfur,[27] to illustrate the relationship between the

[27] Given the fact that the majority of peace missions (approximately 70%, [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/]) are deployed and operate in Africa, two of three illustrative cases this study analyzes are African peace operations. Additionally, African

structural properties and composition of IGO networks and peace operations' effectiveness in executing their core goals. These three cases were selected because they illustrate varied levels operational success in implementing core goals of missions, i.e., conflict abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement, as well as varied levels of network density[28] and composition: Côte d'Ivoire intervention being a quite dense network[29], IGO networks in Bosnia[30] being a relatively sparse network compared to networks in Côte d'Ivoire, and finally Sudan:Darfur[31] intervention being the most sparse network among other IGO networks focused as cases.

These cases provide a general overview of the events leading up the deployment of peace operations in the conflicts under study. It should be noted that, even if significant, cases would not focus on the background of the conflict (though it is touched upon). The main goal here is to discuss and illustrate the interaction between the characteristics of IGO networks, i.e., their structure and composition, and the performance of peace missions operating in Côte d'Ivoire, BiH and Sudan:Darfur, by applying the *Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria.*

Though peacekeeping comes with many different missions and tasks, there are common goals each operation strives to implement" (Diehl and Druckman 2015). According to Diehl and Druckman (2010; 2013; 2015), peacekeeping IGOs aim to achieve three core goals. One core goal of peace operations is violence abatement that is the reduction or elimination of violence in the host country. Another core goal, conflict containment, refers to

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regional and sub-regional organizations are more proactive in addressing the conflicts in their region and likely to collaborate with other IGOs.

[28] Network density scores range between 0 and 1.

[29] IGO network density in Côte d'Ivoire varies between 0.833 and 1 for the years under study (2002-2013).

[30] IGO network density in Bosnia ranges between 0.666 and 1 (1992-2009).

[31] IGO network density in Sudan:Darfur remains 0.666 for all years under study (2004-2013).

"preventing conflict from spreading geographically, including across national borders, as well as keeping the conflict encompassing new actors, both state and sub-national" (Diehl and Druckman 2015, 103). The last core goal that peace operations strive to achieve, for Diehl and Druckman (2010), is conflict settlement. The presence of formal agreements after the deployment of peacekeepers could be judged as a conflict settlement success.

Violence Abatement Success in Côte d'Ivoire

The elimination or reduction of violence is one of the core goals of peace missions, Diehl and Druckman (2010) note. Relying on the UCDP's One-Sided Violence Dataset (version v1.4-2014), the decrease in number of casualties and absence of violence in the host country after the deployment of peacekeepers is used as the indicator to signify success.

A failed coup to topple the President Laurent Gbagbo in September 2002 unraveled the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. The armed insurgency launched by the *Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI) led by disgruntled army officers from marginalized groups in the northern part of the country was joined by two other armed groups, the *Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest* (MPIGO) and the *Mouvement pour la Paix et la Justice* (MP) and united under the *Forces Nouvelles* led by Guillaume Soro (Bellamy and Williams 2013). Taking control of the country's mainly Muslim North, Muslim rebels demanded the resignation of the head of the state, an inclusive election, and reconsideration of issues of nationality and citizenship (Novosseloff 2015).

Though the failed coup escalated the tensions in the country, the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire must be examined within a larger context influenced by three major dimensions (Novosseloff 2015). The first dimension was the power struggle and social and political disorder following the death of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1993. The debate over

national identity, *Ivoirité,* in relation to eligibility to run for presidency, was the second dimension that accounted for the conflict in the country (Akindès 2004). Lastly, the third dimension was the burgeoning economic crisis as a result of historical migratory movements along with immigration waves from neighboring countries (Novosseloff 2015). While the liberal immigration and investment policies of the founding father of the country, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, attracted an influx of foreign investors and laborers, and contributed to economic growth, the fall of coffee and cocoa[32] prices led the economic foundations of the system to falter (The World Bank Report 2008).

Not only were the questions of *Ivoirité* and immigration crises among the factors that contributed to the discontent in the country but they also constituted the reasons behind the neighboring countries' strong interest in internal affairs of Côte d'Ivoire as well as the ECOWAS decision to intervene (Schori 2015). Specifically, the presence of millions of immigrants from neighboring countries, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea, in Côte d'Ivoire, and the country's porous borders meant that the security of the country was a great concern for regional stability (Hara and Yabi 2013).

The unilateral French deployment, *Opération Licorne*, deployed in 2002, was followed by an ECOWAS peacekeeping force (included around 1500 or so troops formed by West African states [Dwan and Wiharta 2005]), the ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (ECOMICI), and a small United Nations political mission, United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI). Working in collaboration with the ECOMICI and MINUCI, France brokered the ceasefire and initiated the negotiations between the government and rebel forces that eventually led to an officially-proclaimed Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The agreement laid out a plan for the formation of an interim Government of National Reconciliation (Holt et al.

[32] Côte d'Ivoire is the top exporter of cocoa in the world (The World Bank Report 2009).

2009), and ECOMICI was mandated to monitor the Ivorian government's and rebel forces' compliance with the peace agreement (Nowrojee 2004).

Even though the proximity of ECOWAS to the conflict country helped the organization to retain its consistent position on the leadership (Yabi 2012), the limitation of ECOWAS resources and capabilities resulted in the organization's extreme dependency on Western donors and extra-regional organizations, consequently its call for a robust UN and AU involvement (Hara and Yabi 2013).

Acting under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) was established in 2004 by the Security Council Resolution 1528. The operation had strength of 6, 910 total uniformed personnel, including troops, military observers, staff and police officers (UNOCI, un.org). While it was initially mandated to support the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the protection of civilians and violence abatement gained a higher priority over the course of the operation (Holt et al. 2009). Having suffered from financial and logistical constraints, ECOMICI was eventually taken up by the UN and became the first blue helmets of UNOCI (De Wet 2014). Despite the lack of required assets, ECOWAS's quick deployment filled in the UN's capability gap in terms of rapid response and prepared the ground for a robust UN mission (Brosig 2015).

ECOWAS acted independently in interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone thanks to Nigeria's military and logistical support, yet it was heavily dependent on the UN's support in Cote d'Ivoire. Indeed, given the financial obstacles associated with maintaining a fully autonomous peacekeeping operation, working in tandem with the UN was attractive for ECOWAS. Operating under the auspices of the UN, ECOWAS was the source of UNOCI's military strength and the most central actor of the peace process (De Wet 2014).

In addition to resource complementarity and dependence, the question of partiality accounted for the ECOWAS-UN collaboration in Côte d'Ivoire and its performance. Some of ECOWAS member states, such as Liberia and Burkina Faso, were sympathetic to the Ivorian protagonists, and were criticized for their support of the rebels. For instance, in 2005, Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo refused to attend ECOWAS-led peace talks in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. He claimed that ECOWAS members supported rebels, who seized the control of northern part of the country, and thus, the organization lost its impartiality. He demanded the withdrawal of ECOWAS forces from Côte d'Ivoire and called for UN and AU led negotiations (IRIN News 2005).

As Schori (2015) argues, on the one hand having various organizations deployed in the same conflict may be problematic since it generates the problem of having too many views and perspectives to harmonize, and adds tasks, such as extra meetings. On the other hand, IGOs, and particularly the UN, obtain invaluable help by being able to count on other organizations. ECOWAS's in-depth knowledge of Côte d'Ivoire, and its hands-on secretariat in Abuja, for instance, provided sustained interest and commitment to the resolution of the conflict.

Furthermore, the lack of communication with host populations is often regarded as the main cause of missed "warning signs of impending violence" (Holt et al. 2009, 304). Presence of a sub-regional organization, i.e., ECOWAS, with the knowledge of culture and language of the country was extremely effective in being able to undertake preventive measures and, thus, dampening violence that is a clear indicator of mission success, for *Diehl and Druckman Evaluation Criteria*.

Even though periodic low-level violence continued in Côte d'Ivoire, interventions by the UN and ECOWAS along with the AU and France, as the former colonial power[33], prevented the escalation of conflict following the contested elections held in 2003-2004 and 2010-2011 from evolving into a full-scale civil war (Bellamy and Williams 2013, 70). The cycle of violence, which erupted in 2003 and 2010, as is shown in Figure 5.1, was halted by robust and continued joint patrolling particularly by ECOWAS and UN (Holt et al. 2009).

Similarly, despite reoccurrence of violence following the elections, the dense network formed by collaborations among AU, ECOWAS and the UN, and coordination and cohesion facilitated by organizational function homophily[34] helped the organizations to respond quickly to post-electoral breakdown and pool required resources and military strength against spoilers, and thus, to be able to enforce robust measures to decrease violence.

**Figure 5.1: Violence in Côte d'Ivoire, 2002-2013**




[33] Even though the presence of French forces along with the UN, AU and ECOWAS played a crucial role in abating violence in Côte d'Ivoire, French intervention is beyond the scope of this study.

[34] Organizational function homophily represents the homophily in the IGO network. This variable is calculated as the proportion of the links between participating IGOs with the same organizational function, i.e., military, civilian, and mixed, to the total IGO collaborative links in the given network. AU, ECOWAS and UN are coded as mixed organizations resulting in a homophilous network.

Note: The data source is the UCDP One-Sided Violence Dataset v1.4, 2014. The dataset reports no fatalities for years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2013.

The disputed presidential runoff election between former president Gbagbo, and former prime minister Quattara escalated the tensions in Côte d'Ivoire. The election "was designed to cap an often forestalled peace process defines by the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement" (Cook 2011, 1). After Quattara claimed electoral victory based on the UN certified election results announced by the Ivorian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), international community recognized and supported the IEC announced results as legitimate, and demanded Gbagbo to hand power over to Quattara. Yet, Gbagbo rejected IEC's decision, and appealed it to the Ivoirian Constitutional Council (ICC). The ICC annulled the IEC's decision and declared Gbagbo as the president. Thus, based on the ICC's decision, Gbagbo refused to step down. The electoral standoff in turn led to the rise of violence and attacks against peacekeepers (Cook 2011).

After months of clashes following the elections in November 2010, the military offensive by forces loyal to the president-elect Alassane Ouattara with ECOWAS and UN's military support defeated the incumbent president, Laurent Gbagbo (Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012). While the UNOCI enforced its military strength against the Gbagbo forces and adopted sanctions against his administration in collaboration with the EU[35], ECOWAS and the AU exerted pressure on Mr. Gbagbo to step down and suspended Côte d'Ivoire from their organizations until Quattara would assume power (Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012). The punitive military measures coupled with regional

[35] On March 30, 2011, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1975 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter imposing sanctions against former President Laurent Gbagbo and his close associates to end the surge of violence in the country and protect civilians, including the use heavy weaponry against them (http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10215.doc.htm).

political efforts played a decisive role in stopping the campaign of violence and prompting the Gbagbo forces to stop fighting.

In conclusion, notwithstanding the rise of violence for a short period of time following the elections, the dense network formed by the AU-UN and ECOWAS collaboration was able to bring a halt to violence in Côte d'Ivoire; thus their collaborative efforts should be judged as a success based on the *Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria*. This dense network (ranges between 0.833 and 1 for the years under study) presumably was instrumental in enhancing the legitimacy of the operations in the eyes of local population and pooling military and financial capabilities to undertake robust measures.

Conflict Containment Success in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia)

The second core goal of peace operations is the containment of conflict in the host country. According to Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria, conflict containment refers to preventing the conflict from spreading new areas, and keeping the conflict from including new actors, e.g., neighboring countries (Diehl and Druckman 2010). The most obvious indicators of conflict containment are "those based on the number of actors and location of violent incidents" (Diehl and Druckman 2015, 2013). To explain the role of inter-organizational networks in accounting for the performance of peace operations in containing conflict, I have chosen to consider the case of Bosnia.

The break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the declarations of independence by the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 marks the start of the conflict in Bosnia in 1991. Bosnia was the most multi-ethnic republic among the Yugoslav Republics. The country was composed of three main ethnic groups: the Croats (17 percent based on the 1991 census), the Serbs (31 percent) and the Muslims (41 percent) (Tardy 2015).

Following the independence and secession of Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia held a referendum on self-determination on February 29, 1992. And on March 1, 1992, the country declared its independence from Yugoslavia (Tardy 2015). Yet, the proclamation of independence of Bosnia propagated attacks by Bosnian Serbs under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic. In a desire to create homogenous Serb areas within the territory of Bosnia and to unite with Serbia, the "Yugoslav People's Army together with paramilitary forces from Serbia carried out the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia" (Bartulovic 2006, 52).

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the first peace mission in Former Yugoslavia, was established in 1992 in Croatia as an interim arrangement to create an environment conducive to a peace settlement in former Yugoslavia. In response to continued Serb "aggression," [Serbs saw it as rightful opposition to dismemberment of the state with outside interference and premature recognition of new states] and growing humanitarian crisis UNPROFOR's mandate was extent to Bosnia in 1992 (Kalyvas and Sambanis 2005).

UNPROFOR mission in Bosnia was mandated by the Security Council to monitor cease-fire arrangements between Bosnian Serb and Bosnian government forces that entered into force on January 1, 1995. UNPROFOR was composed of 39,406 personnel, including military personnel and civilian police, local and international staff.[36]

Fighting in Bosnia came to an end on October 11, 1995. On December 14, the Republic of Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina signed the Dayton Peace Agreement, that signified the formal end to the civil war, and thus, facilitated the deployment of additional peace missions over the next decade (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Even though a key role for major powers may not be necessary for the success of peace missions, they may empower IGO peacekeeping to some extent.

[36] UNPROFOR, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unprof_p.htm

While the United States (US) played a limited role in the early stages of the conflict, the US role became more critical as the crises continued (Burg and Shoup 1999). Indeed, similar to French efforts in Côte d'Ivoire, the US mediation efforts in cooperation with participating IGOs, i.e., UN, NATO, and the EU, were instrumental in the negotiation and signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement.

On December 20, 1995, the NATO-led Multinational Implementation Force, known as IFOR, took over from UNPROFOR, and assumed the primary peacekeeping role in Bosnia. IFOR's size was around 60,000 troops drawn from Allied and partner countries. The mission operated under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter and derived its mandate from the UN Security Council. In 1996, IFOR was succeeded by the NATO-led Stabilization Force, known as SFOR. Like IFOR, SFOR operated under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and was composed of 32,000 troops from Allied countries (nato.int).

The European Union Force (EUFOR) Althea operation that was authorized by the European Council in 2004, and confirmed by the UN Security Council Resolution 1575 as a Chapter VII operation, succeeded SFOR in 2004. When it was deployed, EUFOR Althea had the force level of between 6,500 and 7,000 (Knauer 2011). As a continuation of the NATO operation, EUFOR Althea had a Chapter VII mandate and maintained a 'deterrent' force (Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006).

The Security Council established the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations civilian office that were brought together as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over from UNMIBH on January 10, 2003 (UNMIBH). In addition to these operations, OSCE mission (a civilian mission) maintains field offices across Bosnia (Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006).

As listed above, Bosnia hosted a complex peacekeeping architecture that "evolved out of the 1995 Dayton Accords, originally intended to act as the basis for a relatively short-lived international presence" (Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007, 100). In the late 1990s and in the 2000s, the country witnessed cooperation among various organizations, such as NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR), the UN's International Police Task Force (IPTF), the OSCE, and the EU forming a dense network of collaborative relations.

Despite dense networking conflict containment in Bosnia has a mixed record. It was regarded as a devastating failure before the Dayton Agreement (Diehl and Druckman 2010), conflict containment in Bosnia following the Dayton Agreement has been considered as a success by scholars, such as Diehl and Druckman (2010).

While the former Yugoslavian state, Serbia, continued to play a critical role in escalating conflict in Bosnia by providing arms, material and logistical support to Bosnian Serbs, and Croatia sporadically engaged in fighting (Diehl and Druckman 2010), collective peace efforts by IGOs still cannot be judged as a failure, as conflict containment success does not only focus on reducing the number of conflict parties or belligerents.

Conflict containment also constitutes preventing the conflict from spreading new areas and neighboring countries. In Bosnia, peace operations were largely effective in preventing the spread of the conflict to neighboring countries, such as Macedonia and Albania. The fighting was limited to Bosnian territory, "except for some expansion periodically into Croatia" (Diehl and Druckman 2010, 178). But, all in all, peacekeepers were able to confine the area of conflict.

Particularly, by employing robust enforcement and conflict management techniques that Dayton Agreement required (Tardy 2015), operations under the auspices of NATO and

the UN have proved to be effective in preventing the proliferation of spoilers and belligerents and containing the conflict from spreading to neighboring countries. For instance, The Secretary General of the UN reported that the threat of a NATO air intervention, and in fact, the actual attack, made it possible to negotiate an agreement on the withdrawal of heavy weapons from Sarajevo. The implementation of the agreement was possible because of "the added notion of enforcement by a credible third party" (S/1994/555, para. 8). Similarly, in collaboration with the UN, the rapid reaction force and heavy weapons in the possession of NATO were decisive in compelling Bosnian Serbs to comply with the provisions of the peace agreement, and pressuring Belgrade to cut off support to Bosnian Serb forces.

The degree to which the international community speaks with one voice to the major political actors and spoilers is critical in conflict containment as well since spoilers strive to play one international organization off another (Cockell 2002). In that sense, the dense network through collaborations among UN, NATO, OSCE and EU provided the channels for information exchange, facilitated coordination between organizations and ensured that they would take up a united stance against warring factions.

In line with the findings of my statistical analyses, incongruence of organizational function[37] between IGOs deployed in Bosnia was effective in accounting for conflict containment success. More specifically, collaborations among organizations with different organizational functions were effective in addressing different dimensions of the operations. While military organizations, such as NATO, were effective in containing the conflict by using military muscles and coercion, civilian organizations, such as OSCE and EU, proved to be successful in the negotiation phase. For instance, Serbia has shown commitment, albeit

[37] The organizational function homophily in Bosnian IGO networks range between 0.25 and 0.33, representing heterophilous IGO networks.

somewhat limited, to cooperate with the international community regarding Bosnian war crimes as a stipulation for the country's accession to the EU.

In conclusion, even though maintaining the coherence and coordination among organizations may become problematic over the course of the deployments, cases such as Bosnia illustrate that dense networks formed through collaborations among IGOs help peace operations to pool more resources and put more pressure on spoilers to contain the conflict.

Conflict Settlement Success in Sudan:Darfur

Another core goal of peace operations concentrates on the settlement of the conflict in the host country. In this study, I employ a minimalistic approach to judge the success of conflict settlement. As slight modification of *Diehl and Druckman Evaluation Criteria*, which suggests that one of the key indicators of the peace operations' success is the end of disagreements among belligerents, this study judged the mere presence of a peace agreement and the start of negotiations as a success in conflict settlement.

Peace agreements are not self-implementing, they require constant political attention, intensive regional and international engagement as well as will of key stakeholders (Hansen 2015). Collective efforts by the AU, UN, IGAD, and to some extent the Arab League in Sudan, were effective in enhancing the legitimacy of the peace process, as well as regional and local buy-in, and eventually the progress of the peace process in Darfur. This case study describes how IGOs operating in the field approached the peace process in Darfur, and how their collective efforts affected the progress in conflict settlement.

Darfur, governed by a handful of British colonial administrators until 1956, "remained at the margin of the Sudanese state after independence" (Lanz 2015, 776). The conflict in Darfur is generally attributed to three factors: "competition between nomads and farmers for increasingly scarce resources, intensified by accelerating desertification; the political

manipulation of identities by various Sudanese and regional actors; and a pattern of political and economic marginalization stretching back to the colonial era" (Holt et al. 2009, 337).

The most recent episode of conflict in Darfur started in early 2003 when the long-term and systematic marginalization of Darfurians by the Government in Sudan led to a rebellion (Brosig 2010) by Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). The rebels accused the Arab-dominated Sudanese government in Khartoum of neglecting the Darfur region and arming the *Janjaweed*, militiamen formed by nomadic Muslim tribes, to target Darfur's sedentary farming tribes categorized as 'African' (Barnett and Weiss 2011). The government responded to several attacks by rebel forces with a massive crackdown in which around 300,000 people were killed and two million Darfurians were displaced (Brosing 2010).

In the early stages of the conflict, the reaction to the crisis by international community was mixed. To illustrate, some members of the African Union, i.e., Nigeria, Chad, Libya, and Egypt, criticized the UN's idea of imposing sanction to the Sudanese government arguing that the crisis should be addressed by African states and powers (Reagan and Aydin 2006). African nations' hostility toward an international intervention contributed to the decision of international community to delegate the responsibility to normalize the situation in Darfur to the African Union (Luqman and Omede 2012).

In 2004, the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)—a small observer force—was established bringing a total of 3,320 personnel, including military, civilian personnel as well as civilian police. The mission was mandated to monitor and observe compliance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement signed in N'Djamena in 2004 as well as to contribute to a secure environment for the return of refugees and delivery of humanitarian assistance (UNMIS, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan). When it was deployed, the AMIS had

neither the institutional mechanisms nor sufficient human and material resources to undertake the required peace and security roles (Gelot 2012, 49) though.

Also in places like Darfur where the parties show a greater readiness to settle their disputes with guns than around the negotiating table (Adada 2008), it is difficult, if not impossible, for missions such as AMIS, to get belligerents to agree on a peace agreement, or even a roadmap for an agreement. Operating in this environment, the AU had no choice but to call upon extra-regional organizations, such as the UN, to take part in the peace process. AMIS collaborated with and was supported by numerous IGOs throughout the process. For instance, while NATO airlifted the AU troops in and out of Darfur (Lanz 2015), the EU offered political, financial and technical support for the AU ceasefire-monitoring mission in Darfur and the subsequent peacekeeping missions (Barltrop 2011, 127).

UN operations are particularly difficult to authorize into states with a sitting regime (Badescu and Bergholm 2009). In this sense, when the AU agreed to deploy forces in Sudan, the UN members supported the AU's decision as this would place the major burden of response (Williams 2013, 178) upon the AU and enhance the legitimacy of any possible UN deployment as the AU was the only IGO that had the Sudanese government's consent (Badescu and Bergholm 2009).

When the drafters of the resolution added a clause "inviting" the Sudanese government's consent to the deployment of a UN mission, the Sudanese Government seized this opportunity, and objected to the UN mission arguing that international forces has a hidden agenda (Barnett and Weiss 2011). President Omer Hassan al-Bashir and other Sudanese officials repeatedly rejected the notion of a transition from the AU mission to one involving non-African troops under a UN flag, which they portrayed as an "imperialistic" plan to "recolonize" Sudan (Harsch 2006). President Omar al-Bashir's government dictated that

the AU would take the lead precisely 'because it was the more benign option due to its operational and political constraints' (Paddon 2011, 529).

In that environment, the hybrid African Union and United Nations Mission (UNAMID) was the solution proposed by then Secretary General Kofi Annan to address Khartoum's resistance and reluctance regarding the questions of legitimacy (Lanz 2015). Established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1769 in July 2007, UNAMID was authorized to consist of up to 19,555 military personnel, including liaison officers and military observers, and civilian personnel. The mission was mandated to protect civilian populations under threat, prevent attacks against civilians, and assist the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement[38] and any subsequent agreements (S/RES/1769[2007]).

Although UNAMID failed to get all viable actors to sign a sustainable peace agreement, it was relatively successful in promoting the peace process and leading the Darfur Dialogue of Consultation that brought sectors of society together to discuss the peace process (Lanz 2015). Additionally, the Doha Document for Peace brokered by the IGOs deployed in Darfur, though considered to be a failed attempt in producing a comprehensive peace agreement, brought about a useful conversation about Darfur's future and the path to a comprehensive and inclusive solution to the conflict in the region.

In light of these developments, what could be argued regarding the role of dense IGO network formed by IGAD, AU, the Arab League and the UN in accounting for the success of the conflict settlement in Darfur? On the one hand, the presence of the AU, the Arab League and IGAD enabled the UN to avoid being viewed as an actor motivated by imperialist interests. Similarly, the presence of regional actors also helped IGOs that engaged in

[38] The 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement, also known as the Abuja Agreement, was signed between the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A. The agreement was led by the AU, yet representatives from other IGOs, such as the Arab League, the UN, and the EU were present and worked in collaboration with the AU.

negotiations to garner and secure regional and local support for the peace process. On the other hand, African states sought the UN's support and endorsement of the regional actions, particularly that of the AU, in Darfur, as they wanted the peace process to be viewed as furthering regional as well as international interests (Gelot 2012).

In Darfur, IGAD assumed a supporting role in peace process through its mediation efforts as well. The efforts within IGAD to improve security arrangements in the Horn of Africa took place in the context of a broad international consensus that regional organizations should contribute to the management of conflict and the maintenance of international order (Healy 2009, 1). For instance, regional actors and leaders praised IGAD's engagement in African conflicts. Mr. Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda, with regard to IGAD's role in Sudan, claimed that countries in IGAD region (the Horn of Africa) and Africa as a whole created a viable partnership "which reduces chances for outsiders to jump into solving regional conflicts yet they have very little knowledge of them" (Tavares 2010, 53).

In collaboration with the IGAD, UNAMID has played a leading role in coordination of international efforts. UNAMID also strived to localize peace process and empower Darfurians to limit the role of rebel groups (Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2012).

Even though negotiations in Darfur failed to reach a comprehensive, full-fledged peace agreement that would settle the conflict, the collaborative efforts between the IGOs can be viewed as a relative success, as they were able to get warring parties and the government to the negotiation table. Similar to peace operations deployed in Côte d'Ivoire, the presence of African peacekeepers proved essential for the legitimacy of the operation and generating a popular sentiment that the process was a homegrown initiative. While the presence of the UN provided the international legitimacy the peace process was in need of,

the presence of regional and/or sub-regional organizations, such as the AU, and IGAD, enhanced the local legitimacy (Gelot 2012).

However, different from peace operations in Bosnia and Côte d'Ivoire, the conflict in Darfur did not receive an intervention by a major power or a former colonial country, as was the French intervention in Côte d'Ivoire, and US negotiation efforts in Bosnia. Even though the absence of the intervention by a former colonial state may have helped to garner local and national support for the peace process and negotiations, peace missions were deprived of the material and intellectual impetus that these powers can provide (Bellamy and Williams 2005). Partnerships in peace operations do not mean that all parties agree on all aspects of the mission; yet it is still important to develop a shared framework to ensure "engagement through a feeling of mutual ownership" (Clement and Smith 2009, 10). In this sense, it can be argued that having similar organizational function would facilitate the process while sustaining links, and thus, generate a more positive environment for partnering organizations.

The findings of my statistical analyses suggested that homophilous IGO networks[39] with regard to organizational function are more likely to be successful in settling conflicts as compared to heterophilous networks (though the finding is not statistically significant). However, IGO networks in Darfur revealed a different pattern and demonstrated that collaborations among organizations with different functions would be more effective (than homophilous networks) in addressing conflict settlement. The AU and UN are mixed type of IGOs (undertaking both civilian and military tasks) and generally undertook the military tasks; the Arab League and IGAD (civilian organizations) remained focused on the civilian dimensions of the conflict.

[39] Organizational function homophily scores in Darfur range between 0.44 and 0.5, indicating a relatively heterophilous network.

Deployment of IGOs with different organizational functions presumably facilitates the division of labor, as the case in Darfur shows. To illustrate, while the AU and UN focused on the military aspects of the conflict, such as patrolling the refugee and internally displaced people (IDP) camps (Fryer 2013), the Arab League, particularly IGAD, engaged in mediation efforts. IGAD's efforts, though they failed to usher in a comprehensive peace agreement, were critical in receiving regional endorsement for the peace process (International Crisis Group Report 25 March 2004).

In conclusion, what the Darfur case illustrates is that a dense network, including regional and sub-regional organizations with an understanding of the culture, the roots of the conflict, a vested interest in witnessing the end of the conflict and return to normalcy (De Maio 2009); and extra-regional organizations that vindicate the peace process (by showing that it is not used an instrument for the assertion of hegemonic control [Paddon 2011]) helps the peace process move forward.

Additionally, similar to the Bosnian intervention, Darfurian case underscores that collaboration among organizations with different organizational functions may be more effective in conflict settlement as compared to missions deployed by IGOs with the same organizational function as it presumably facilitates complementarity of missions and the division of labor.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I presented a novel way of empirically capturing the IGO networks in peace operations and examine how their structural properties and composition matter for the success of peace missions in accomplishing their core goals. The density of inter-organizational networks among IGOs appears to be important factors associated with peace operations' performance, as hypothesized. Additionally, composition of IGO networks and

particularly having similar organizational functions are associated with the performance of peace operations in undertaking violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement. Thus these results show how analyzing the structure and composition of IGO networks can provide more nuanced theoretical and empirical explanations of the performance of peace missions in internal armed conflicts.

In contemporary peace operations, the UN is not the sole player in the field. Thus, the success and failure of peace missions to a large extent depends on the coordination and collaborations among organizations and actors involved. In addition to presenting findings of the statistical analyses, I covered three illustrative cases to demonstrate how IGO networks' composition and structural properties accounted for the successes of violence abatement in Cote d'Ivoire, conflict containment in Bosnia and conflict settlement in Darfur.

These cases demonstrate how IGO networks are formed matters. Although dense IGO networks in Bosnia (although not as dense as those in Côte d'Ivoire) were successful in containing conflict in the country, organizational function heterophily, rather the organizational function homophily, as was the case in Côte d'Ivoire, was instrumental in affecting conflict containment success. Similarly, in Darfur, the incongruence in organizational function facilitated the division of labor and implementation of the peace process. Even though the UN and AU along with IGAD and the Arab League, engaged in peace negotiations, the military power (that is not available to civilian organizations, such as IGAD) they brought in, promoted the implementation of the peace process by enforcing a robust mission.

Next chapter provides a summary of this dissertation's findings, discusses its empirical, theoretical and policy implications, and concludes with the directions for future research.

# CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION

## Introduction

In this study, employing social network analysis, I analyzed the factors that determine the formation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs engaged in peace operations, and the effect of these collaborations on the success and failure of peace missions.

This dissertation was comprised of two parts. The first part analyzed the motives for IGOs to form inter-organizational partnerships. The second part of this study examined the role of IGO networks, their structural properties and composition, in accounting for peace operations' performance in implementing their core goals.

In this study, applying the multi-theoretical multi-level (MTML) framework, I put forward theory-driven hypotheses to explain the motives for IGOs to collaborate in conducting peace operations despite the fact that there are risks, such as losing autonomy, and organizational identity; and collective dilemmas, such as free-riding, associated with such partnerships.

Drawing on theories of resource dependence, social capital, social network analysis, e.g., homophily, I tested arguments with regard to the theories on inter-organizational collaboration and presented a novel way of capturing the processes that account for the formation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs engaged in peace missions.

Furthermore, applying the *Diehl-Druckman Evaluation Criteria*, this study analyzed the role of collaborative relations and the networks that IGOs form in affecting the performance of peace operations' core goals: violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement.

This concluding chapter provides a summary of my findings with regard the IGO collaborations and their impact on peace operations' success and failure, and discusses empirical and theoretical as well as policy implications of this study. The chapter concludes with directions for future research.

## Summary of Findings

### *Why Do IGOs Collaborate in Peace Operations?*

Findings from the Temporal Exponential Random Graph Models (TERGMs) partially supported my hypotheses in terms of the formation and evolution of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs engaged in peace operations and led to important insights regarding the role of resource dependence and complementarity in driving such collaborative relations.

One of the most surprising, but interesting, findings of this study related to the measure of prior bad experiences—the bad news effect (Pearson et al. 2013). I hypothesized that IGO dyads engaged in operations that were discredited as failures would less likely to collaborate in future operations or maintain their partnerships. However, though the coefficient was quite small in magnitude, I found a positive coefficient, suggesting that organizations would maintain their collaboration notwithstanding bad news, specifically their failure in providing the security of peacekeepers.

Another surprising finding of this study related to the measure of homophily. Contrary to the existing research on homophily that suggests that similarity breeds formation of ties, organizational function homophily did not prove to account for the formation IGO partnerships in peace missions. However, my findings provided evidence that similar organizations with regard to their organizational type are less likely to collaborate.

Quite consistent with this organizational type heterophily finding, and contrary to previous research (Cranmer et al. 2012b), I found that distance between IGOs had a positive effect in accounting for formation of IGO collaborations. This finding further confirmed the theories of resource dependence and exchange by showing that IGOs were more likely to team up with the organizations that could provide required capabilities and resources. More specifically, organizations would forge relationships with one another on the basis of their need for military capabilities, human and financial resources, rather than their proximity, since many of them were not capable of carrying out large-scale and robust operations that contemporary peace missions entail.

Conversely, my results suggested that organizations located in the same geographical region were more likely initiate partnerships, providing further support for the regionalization of peace operations arguments (Sidhu 2006).

This study also provided evidence that once IGOs formed relations, they tend to persist their collaborations because these prior ties, even if they may have failed[40], would breed trust among organizations mitigating the costs of collective action. Prior collaborations may, furthermore, facilitate the diffusion of norms, values, and common practices across organizations, and presumably provide organizations the opportunity to draw on their experience.

*How Do the Characteristics of IGO Networks Account for the Performance of Peace Operations?*

What do logit results and illustrative cases tell us about the role of inter-organizational collaborations in peace operations?

[40] For instance, they may fail in providing the safety of peacekeepers.

The results of the study presented here confirmed my hypotheses that structural properties of IGO networks carrying out peace operations matter for the performance of these missions. As described in detail in Chapter 5, my findings suggested that peace operations conducted by dense IGO networks (as compared to sparse networks) were more likely to be successful in reducing violence, containing and settling conflicts. Therefore, the main conclusion one can draw from this study is that IGO network density, which entails widely inclusive networks, matters for peace operation success with regard to violence abatement and conflict settlement.

It appears that dense networks that constitute regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations are more likely to enhance the legitimacy of peace operations and acquire required resources and capabilities that are often cited as critical elements in contributing the success of peace missions. For instance, the relative success of peace settlement in Darfur could be attributed to the dense network of collaborations among regional, sub-regional and extra-regional organizations, i.e., the AU, IGAD, the Arab League and the UN, as collectively they were able to coerce spoilers to agree on terms of the peace agreement. Additionally, these dense networks presumably generated a perception among IGOs that “they have a stake in the mission’s performance” (Gelot 2012, 134) and thus, should work harder.

This study also tested an argument regarding the role of network centralization in accounting for peace operations’ performance. In contrast to the previous research on the subject, I did not find any statistical evidence suggesting that centralized IGO networks were more likely to be successful in undertaking peace operations’ core tasks, even though the relationship appeared to be positive as hypothesized.

My hypothesis regarding organizational function homophily stated that peace operations conducted by IGOs sharing the same organizational function would be more successful. Interestingly, despite the positive relationship between the organizational function homophily and success in violence abatement and conflict settlement, organizational function homophily coefficient was negative in conflict containment model, suggesting a negative relationship. This result may be attributed to the certain tasks that conflict containment process entails.

Conflict containment dimension of peace operations constitutes two core tasks: geographic and actor-based containment of the conflict. In this sense, while civilian organizations may be better suited to undertake such roles as preventing the spread of the conflict, mixed or military organizations may be better equipped to deal with another aspect of the mission, for instance, fighting with spoilers, preventing the import of arms or personnel (Diehl and Druckman 2010). Possessing different organizational function, e.g., cultures, may also facilitate the division of labor between IGOs and avoid the duplication of efforts.

In addition to statistical analyses, this study employed cases studies to illustrate how structural properties and composition of IGOs affect the performance of peace operations in abating violence, containing and settling conflict, in Cote d'Ivoire, Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia) and Darfur respectively. These illustrative cases provided evidence for the positive effect of dense collaborative relations among IGOs in accounting for the performance of missions. These findings, therefore, may suggest that fostering inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs is critical, as they will enhance the effectiveness of peace operations.

**Theoretical and Empirical Implications**

Although there is a considerable amount of research on UN's role in peace operations as the primary actor, the research on other peacekeeping actors, such as regional and sub-regional organizations, is still limited. By analyzing interactions among these entities, this study gives insights into the effect of collaborative relations among IGOs in the maintenance of regional and international peace and security, more specially the outcomes of peace operations.

This dissertation is the first study that applies a social network analysis framework to research the collaborative relations among IGOs executing peace operations. In contrast to previous studies (Balas 2011a), this study shows that network analysis can be usefully utilized to explain inter-organizational collaborations between IGOs in peace operations. Network effects, for instance, friend-of-a-friend triadic closure, suggesting that two organizations connected to a common organization would be more likely to collaborate, were evident in formation and evolution of partnerships among IGOs, African Union (AU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partnership in Somalia (they both collaborated with the UN) is a case in point.

Prior work on peace operations analyzed operational level factors that contribute to the success of peace operations through a limited number of personal observations of former peacekeeping practitioners and comparisons of only a few missions. Even though the study of peace operations benefits from the micro-level analysis, such as the local dimensions of the conflict in which peace operations are deployed, "the closer one gets to the local specificities of individual peace operations, the easier it may be to lose sight of the broader patterns of missions, including how they fit into—and are reflections of—international political writ" (Paris 2014, 501). Using social network analysis and quantitative methods allowed for the evaluation and comparison of a large number of peace operations,

and thus, set a foundation for predicting how and why the inter-organizational networks and their structural properties account for the success of peace operations.

Furthermore, analyzing and comparing the role of inter-organizational interactions in conducting peace operations would enlarge studies on organizational learning and practices by providing insights on which types of IGO networks and collaborations perform better than others, and why. Consequently, this may allow for the design and conduct of more effective missions and provide an impetus for repeating the best practices.

**Policy Implications**

In addition to its theoretical and empirical implications, this study presented here has policy implications and provides a variety of lessons for the deployment, planning and coordination of future peace operations.

Given the complexity of causal factors that drive the success of peace missions, any conclusions are limited in scope. With this caveat in mind, this study could shed light on the effective practices that can be adopted by IGOs on the ground.

Despite the fact that many of the factors affecting the peace operations' performance are indeed beyond the power of peacekeepers and organizations to change, this study suggests that peace operations can be conducted and designed in a way to mitigate some of the undesirable conditions that these operations encounter. In that sense, "lessons learned" efforts could draw on the best practices from the field.

This study makes the case that the inclusion of all viable and key IGO actors in which the region the conflict takes place may enhance the legitimacy of the collective efforts. To illustrate, "as they are of the region, regional organizations bring strong background knowledge and existing personal and professional contacts to the process, permitting the

ease of access and an ability to exert pressure that may not be available to the UN" (Boulden 2003, 1-2).

Additionally, dense relations that are formed by these collaborative efforts would help operations to pool more resources and required capabilities that one organization is less likely to provide. They may also facilitate the division of labor on the ground and help organizations to focus on their comparative advantages.

Dense networks may enable information exchange and generate trust among IGOs. Information exchange and trust would assist organizations to synchronize and harmonize their partnerships, prevent conflicting mandates, and duplication of efforts, and thus, would help IGOs use their resources and capabilities more effectively.

Testing and conceptualizing framework for evaluating and studying IGO collaborations can contribute to the institutionalization of these collaborative efforts, as opposed to the formation of ad hoc partnerships. Well-designed and institutionalized IGO partnerships on the ground may fight against political and economic uncertainty as well.

**Agenda for Future Research**

Future research may provide a more in depth exploration of IGO dyads and groups to determine which organizations "have the potential to cooperate most effectively" (Tavares 2010, 17) with another, get along and why.

In this study, the emphasis is placed on the IGOs. Yet, IGOs are rarely the only actors involved in peace processes, and conducting operations on the ground. Addressing complex problems and daunting challenges, such as building or rebuilding institutions of war-ravaged countries, protecting civilians and providing humanitarian assistance amid violence, require other actors and partners, including local governments, NGOs, and nation states to buy in. Therefore, future research would benefit from examining not only the interactions

among IGOs conducting peace operations but also the networks among NGOs and IGO-NGO collaborative efforts.

Moreover, studying collaborations among unilateral operations conducted by states, such as French peacekeeping operation, *Opération Licorne*, deployed in Côte d'Ivoire, and IGOs, and their impact on peace operations' effectiveness is a potential research project that scholars could tackle with.

This study did not analyze the role of IGO collaborations operating in conflicts between states, i.e., interstate conflicts. Future research might apply this study's framework to the conflicts between states. This will, in turn, provide a further test for the generalizability of the findings of this study.

Furthermore, future research may benefit from a more in-depth exploration of collaborative peacekeeping efforts by collecting more network data via interviews with IGO officials. This practice would serve as another major test for the generalizability of current studies' findings as well.

Another issue to be taken into consideration by the research community is to adopt a different coding scheme for measuring peace operations' success, such as providing a more precise differentiation between success measures, i.e., including a partial success coding.

A more nuanced conflict containment coding differentiating between actor wise and geographical conflict containment also has merit. Even though some operations may fail in preventing the spread of the conflict, they may become successful in reducing or limiting the number of warring factions. Thus, despite being judged as successful missions with regard to actor-based conflict containment, they may be considered failed operations in preventing the spread of conflict to neighboring countries, or within the host country. Therefore, different assessments and a more nuance coding scheme (coding success in actor-based conflict

containment and geographical containment separately) may provide a better understanding of the factors that contribute to success in conflict containment.

# APPENDIX

## The List Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

African Union

Arab League

Association of Southeast Asian Nations

Caribbean Community

Central African Economic and Monetary Community

Collective Security Treaty Organization

Commonwealth of Independent States

Community of Portuguese Language Countries

Economic Community of Central African States

Economic Community of West African States

European Union

Gulf Cooperation Council

Intergovernmental Authority on Development

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Organization of American States

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Organization of Islamic Cooperation

Shanghai Cooperation Council

South African Development Community

United Nations

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## ABSTRACT

## INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS AMONG INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

by

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**Major:** Political Science

**Degree:** Doctor of Philosophy

Notwithstanding the growing consensus on benefits associated with collaborations among intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in peace operations, academic research has thus far neglected pressing questions of why and how IGOs collaborate within a network context in peace operations and how these inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs, *IGO networks*, might account for the success/failure of these operations. This dissertation concentrates on how composition and structural properties of IGO networks, such as the extensiveness of ties between network partners, and the cohesiveness of such networks, may account for peace operations' performance in accomplishing their core goals: violence abatement, conflict containment and conflict settlement (Diehl and Druckman 2010).

This study uses a newly collected relational dataset of inter-organizational collaborations among IGOs in peace operations deployed in internal armed conflicts and covers the period between 1990 to 2013 to assess and examine the determinants of collaboration among IGOs engaged in peace operations and the role of these collaborations,

and their structural characteristics, in performance of peace missions. My hypotheses are tested using inferential network analysis and logit models to capture the effect of inter-organizational networks on peace operations' outcomes.

Drawing on a multidisciplinary framework bringing together insights from international relations, social network analysis and organizational studies, this study found that dense and cohesive IGO networks, will have a moderating effect on network effectiveness. Specifically, higher density of IGO networks is associated with successful outcomes in abating violence and settling conflicts.

## AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Işıl Akbulut earned her bachelor's degree from Middle East Technical University, Turkey and her master's degree from Wayne State University. Her primary areas of teaching and research include organizational collaborations in peace operations, terrorism, social network analysis and political Islam. Her research on terrorist networks has appeared in *Terrorism and Political Violence*. She will join the Department of Government, Politics and Global Studies at Sacred Heart University in Fairfield, CT in August 2016.